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"Once deterrence fails, it fails completely; the 
rudimentary design and short endurance of our 
C3I system nullifies the whole conception of 
multible, time-phased counterforce exchanges. 
The pursuit of a bargaining advantage by means 
of limited attack is a purely intellectual 
construction that has little or no relevance to 
present circumstances".
Bruce Blair: "Strategic command and control"
(1985 Brooklyns), p.5.
"The last five years discussion has shown that 
the knowledge of and the confidence with 
Greenlands role in security policies at least 
until recently has been very limited at home (Denmark), and in Greenland politicians and 
public opinion stands quite faltering in 
relation to these issues. There is clearly a 
need for not only increased research concerning 
Arctic security policy issues, but also an 
increased priority for these issues on the De­
partment of Foreign Affairs, Department of 
Defense .... agenda".Nikolaj Petersen: "Gr0nland i dansk
s i k k e r h e d s p o l i t i k "  , D a n s k  
Udenrigspo1itisk Arbog 1987, 
(K0benhavn 1988), p. 48.
4ABSTRACT:
This paper deals with one of the US military installations at 
Thule, Greenland; namely the newly modernized Ballistic Missile 
Early Warning System (BMEWS) radar. The thesis will address six re­
search questions:
1 * What is the role of the radar at Thule in the US ballisticmissile warning system ?.
2 * What was the rationale for the recent modernization, and
how is this related to various conceptions of nuclear 
deterrence ?.
3 * Will the installation be able to play any role in a future
SDI system or in relation to ASAT warfare?
4 * What is the relationship between the modernization of the
radar and arms control, especially implications for the 
ABM Treaty ?.
5 * What is the Danish Social Democrats position on nuclear
deterrence, SDI and arms control?.
6 * Which factors can explain the Danish Social Democrats
policy in relation to the modernization of the radar ?.
The basic arguments in the thesis is, firstly that the moder­nization was initiated with a rationale of enhancing the quality of 
tactical assessment and characterization data the installation 
could provide. This modernization of C3I systems is one of the 
preconditions for the present US strategic policy of nuclear 
warfighting. Secondly it is argued that there seems to be a 
contradiction between the SD policy on the radar issue and other 
related security policy issues. The various factors for this 
apparent contradiction will therefore be analyzed.
Abbreviations and acronyms:
ACT: Arms Control Today.
ASAT: Anti Satellite Warfare.
ABM: Anti Ballistic Missile.
ALCM: Air Launched Cruise Missile
ALPS: Accidental Launch Protection System.
AWST: Aviation Week and Space Technology 
AFB: Air Force Base.
ABM Treaty: Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty.
AFSATCOM: Air Force Satellite Communication system.
BMEWS: Ballistic Missile Early Warning System.
BSTS: Boostphase Surveillance and Tracking System.
CONUS: Continental USA.
CSOC: Consolidated Space Operations Center.C3: Command, Control and Communication.
C3I: Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence.
DE: Defense Electronics.
DEW: Distant Early Warning.
DMSP: Defense Meteorological Satellite Program.DSU: The Social Democrats Youth Organization 
DSCS: Defense Satellite Communication system DSM: Data System Modernization.
DSP: Defense Support Program.
ELINT: Electronic Intelligence.
EMP: Electro Magnetic Pulse.
ERIS: Exo atmospheric Reentry Interceptor System
FTV: Functional Test vehicle.
GHz: GegaHertz
GBR: Ground Based Radar.
GEODESS: Ground-Based Electro Optical Deep-space System. 
HOE: Homing Overlay Experiment.
HEDI: High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor.
IONDS: Independent Operational Nuclear Detection System. 
ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile.
JRSC: Jam Resistant and Secure Communications.
LPAR: Large Phased Array Radar.
MAD: Mutually Assured Destruction.
MIP: Missile Impact Predictor 
MHz: MegaHertz.
MHV: Miniature Homing Vehicle .
MW: Megawatts.
MIRV: Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicles.
6NCA: National Command Authority.NORAD: North American Air Defense 
NAVSPASUR: US Navy Space Surveillance 
NSC: National Security Council.
OTH: Over The Horizon.
PARCS: Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Character 
System
RV: Reentry Vehicle.
SDIO: Strategic Defense Initiative Organization.
SIOP: Single Integrated Operational Plan.
SAC: Strategic Air Command.
SCC: Standing Consultative Commission.
SCF: Satellite Control Facility 
SD: Social Democratic party.
SDI: Strategic Defense Initiative- 
SDS: Satellite Data System.
SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. SSTS: Spacebased Surveillance and Tracking System.
SLBM: Sea Launched Ballistic Missile.
SLBN: Nuclear armed submarine.
SPADOC: Space Defense Operations Center.
STC: Satellite Test Center.
UCS: Union of Concerned Scientists.
US: United States of America.USAF: United States Air Force.
USSR: The Soviet Union.
PREFACE:
Many times while I have been working on this subject, 
people have asked me : "Why on Earth are you doing research on a
subject as the Thule radar?". The reasons for this are to be found 
in 3 conditions. Firstly, I was born in Greenland (Egedesminde) 
and this no doubt made me more inclined to take interest in US 
installations in Greenland. Secondly, during the autumn of 1984 I 
had a seminar with Michael Krasner (at Institute of Political 
Science, University of Aarhus, Denmark) which dealt with "New 
issues in nuclear strategy". During this course I read Desmond 
Ball's "Can nuclear war be controlled?". This caught my interest 
and it was on this background natural to analyze the modernization 
of the radar. Finally, there is clearly a need for (Danish) research 
concerning Arctic security issues. Professor Nikolaj Petersen has 
clearly expressed this several times. The lack of available research 
makes political debates less stringent and qualified. One 
implication of this is that speculations of various kind flow 
freely around.
It is my hope that perhaps this thesis can contribute to 
a more informed debate on the issue of US facilities in Greenland. 
Most particularly, it is my hope that the thesis can provide a 
point of departure for a discussion of whether the radar support 
deterrence and enhance the global strategic balance, or if they 
enhance warfighting capabilities and thereby increase global 
instability.
For the analysis of the radar modernization and the 
functioning of the radar, it has been necessary to provide rather 
technical material. However, I have found (under the influence of 
professor Des Ball!!) that a decent analysis is not possible without 
this element. Thus, the analysis of the radar should be valid for 
the next 5 years since the development of more sophisticated sensor 
systems will take this time to be fully developed and tested.
During my research, I had serious problems finding 
relevant material for the analysis of the implications of the 
modernization. To people who are interested in these matters, I 
have used the footnotes as a source for further information. Both 
in relation to additional explanations, but also with extensive use 
of references.
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8If it is accepted that the use of nuclear 
weapons poses unacceptable risks, then extensive 
and elaborate warfighting plans do not make a 
great deal of sense"(x)
CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION :
On 5 March 1987, the Folketing (the Danish Parliament) 
decided not to oppose the current upgrading(* 2) of the US (United 
States) early warning radar system at Thule, Greenland(3) . However 
the Folketing has stipulated that the radar should not be used as a 
part of an ABM (Anti Ballistic Missile) system or in connection 
with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
Lasse Budtz (then the leading defense spokesman of the 
Social Democrats (SD), the biggest opposition party) said after the 
decision:
"We are probably ready to accept the upgrading to a
1: John Barylis "NATO strategy: the case for a new strategic 
concept" in International Affairs, Vol. 64 No 1, Winter 1987/88,
p . 56.
2: In this part of the paper there should be no specific value, 
attached to the use of terms as "modernization", "replacing", "Up­
grading", "changing" etc.These are simply used to illustrate 
changed technical nature of the radar installation at Thule. 
the later section for a discussion of the most appropriate tet-cnlNoi- 
ogy to be used in the case of Thule.
3: Greenland is a Danish county with a large degree of auto 
nomy. However, foreign, fiscal, security and monetary policiesw  
directed from Copenhagen in Denmark.
9
phased- array radar system, but we want to make sure 
that one day we are not suddenly told that now it is 
to be used for an ABM system or for SDI".(4)
This statement illustrates some of the uncertainty or 
confusion within Denmark about the reasons for the modernization and 
the future capabilities of the radar. The debate which raged in 
the Danish press and Folketing before the controversial decision, 
focused on, whether the modernization was merely a necessary 
upgrading of a 20 year old installation, or a part of a later ABM 
or Anti Satellite (ASAT) system. In the course of this discussion 
the implications for the future of arms control - and in particular 
the ABM treaty, were also discussed. The debate did not deal with 
the basic or original reason for the modernization as expressed 
during testimony to the US Congress; namely the perceived need in 
the US a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  to enhance nuclear warfighting 
capabilities(5 ) . This thesis also adresses this aspect, since it 
is necessary for the analysis of the radar modernization.
One of the factors contributing to the confusion in Danish 
public debate on the issue has been the secrecy which has 
surrounded the US installations, and the lack of information
4: Science. 20 March 1987, p.1456.
5: One can speculate if the reason for the lack of debatem 
relation to nuclear warfighting strategies was caused by lackcf 
knowledge on this issue on part of policymakers in the Folketir>tj. 
In 1983 there was a debate in the Folketing concerning the radir 
issue, which followed the publishing of the book "Gr0nlan<j 
Middelhavets perle" by Paul Claesson (Copenhagen 1983). Claes^ o»' 
argued, as did the left wing in the Folketing, that the radar 4- 
other US military installations in Greenland were a part of a 
strategy of preemption. The debate in the Folketing centre 
around this claim, and the issue of nuclear warfighting did no* 
arise. See Folketingets Forhandlinger (Official reports from 
negotiations in the Folketing) 10 February 1983, pp. 5859-5916.
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emanating from the Danish bureaucracy. Information which can be 
gained by reading official US sources is not readily available in 
Denmark, and this dearth of information sets real limits for the 
conduct of the debate. It is therefore not surprising that both the 
political and media debate have been riddled with speculations and 
contradictory assertions.
It has been argued that the US military installations in 
Greenland are the most important Danish contribution to the NATO 
alliance(6). It could therefore be argued that the military instal­
lations at Thule were a compensation for the very low Danish 
defense budget. The Danish defense expenditures are among the
7lowest in the alliance in relation to GDP( ). Further, Denmark has 
in recent years been known as the "footnote nation" of the NATO 
alliance. The Danish resistance against the "double track"(8) 
decision (after the decision was taken) and against contributing 
financially to the implementation of the decision are only a few 
examples of the Danish divergence from the official NATO policy.
It is therefore interesting to look at the relationship between the 
installations in Thule and the political/military relationship 
between the US and Denmark. The important question in this thesis 
is why Denmark and especially the Danish SD are so accommodating in 
Greenland while at the same time being recalcitrant in other
6:Petersen, Nikolaj. "Denmark, Greenland and arctic security" 
Institute for Political Science, Aarhus University October 19^ 1p. 2.
7: See for instance SIPRI Yearbook 1987, pp 122, 163, 173 fbr a description of the Danish defense expenditures. Denmark hast.bG 
lowest defense expenditures (apart from Luxembourg)
8: the decision to deploy Pershing II and Cruise missiles \r) 
Western Europe.
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, 9 \areas( ) .
The thesis will on this background seek to answer six 
research questions:
1) What is the role of the radar at Thule in the US ballistic mis­
sile warning system ?.
2) What was the rationale for the recent modernization, and how is 
this related to various conceptions of nuclear deterrence ?.
3) Will the installation be able to play any role in a future US 
ALPS/SDI system or in relation to ASAT warfare ?.
4) What is the relationship between the modernization of the radar 
and arms control, especially the ABM Treaty ?.
5) What is the Danish Social Democrats position on nuclear deter 
rence, SDI and arms control (the ABM treaty)?.
6) On the basis of the above, which factors can explain the Danish 
SD policy in relation to the radar issue ?.
For the purpose of this thesis, it is intended to present 
the paper in chapters as follows:
CHAPTER TWO : Warning and nuclear deterrence.
A more detailed discussion of the research questions 
needs to be preceeded by a clarification of key concepts in this 
paper. Firstly, a delineation of various aspects of warning is 
made. This part discusses concepts such as tactical and strategic
9 : The US have installations in other parts of Greenland. For 
instance Station Nord, Sdr Str0mf jord, the DEW stations and OL-5 (Po> 
tachment 3). These could be dealt with in this connection, but-iwe 
scope of the thesis makes this limitation necessary.
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warning; attack warning and assessment; and the horizontal and 
vertical integration of the US warning system. The second part of 
the chapter discusses the major conceptions of nuclear deterrence. 
The point of departure is the old discussion between Hermann Kahn 
and Bernard Brodie. This cleavage between these two conceptions of 
deterrence is followed by a discussion of the present major 
positions in the current debate.
CHAPTER THREE : The radar, the warning system, the modernization 
and nuclear strategy.
The chapter start with a description of the present US 
ballistic missile warning system and especially the role of Thule 
in this regard. Secondly, the modernization of Thule is dealt with, 
while the last part of the chapter relates the Thule modernization 
to the conceptions of deterrence.
CHAPTER FOUR : Thule, ALPS/SDI, ASAT and arms control.
During the debate in Denmark in 1987, there were several 
claims that the modernization was linked to such issues as SDI, 
ASAT and arms control. The chapter adresses these issues 
respectively.
CHAPTER FIVE : The radar, the political debate in Denmark and the 
SD policy on nuclear deterrence, SDI and arms control.
The purpose of the chapter is to analyze the SD security 
policy position and especially the SD position on nuclear 
deterrence, SDI and arms control (the ABM Treaty question). The 
modernization of the installation, conceptions of nuclear
13
deterrence and the SD position are then linked together.
CHAPTER SIX: Analysis of the SD policy on the radar issue.
Since there seems to be a contradiction between the SD 
security policy goals and the modernization of the installation at 
Thule, the reasons for the SD policy stand need to be discussed and 
analyzed. The chapter focuses on external factors (the US/NATO 
Danish relationship and the relationship between the SD and other 
European SD parties) and internal factors, which are divided into 
three categories. These categories are the "parliamentary" or 
"inter-party" level, the "intra-party" level, the relationship bet­
ween Greenland and Denmark.
CHAPTER SEVEN: Conclusions.
This part will sum up the findings of the thesis and make 
a subjective assessment of which influence paths were the most 
important for the SD position on the radar issue.
The analysis of the radar issue in Danish politics could 
have been conducted at the national level. However, it does not 
make any significant difference to conduct the inquiry at the party 
level due to the very special parliamentary situation in Denmark. 
This is further described in Chapter Five.
The reason for the focus on the SD is that the party 
holds a pivotal role in the formulation of the Danish security 
policy. The party was in government until 1982, is currently the
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biggest opposition party (10) and could in the near future become 
the leading party in a new government coalition. Furthermore, the 
party has been a major partner in all significant defense decisions 
in the Folketing. Another reason for focusing on the SD is due to 
the changes in the party's security policy, especially in relation 
to nuclear weapons. These changes include the adoption of a critical 
view of the concept of nuclear deterrence, and especially the em­
phasis on nuclear warfighting strategies. Nevertheless it should be 
noted that the party has not released any comprehensive or explicit 
stand on the concept of nuclear deterrence. The analysis of the 
party's stand on this issue will consequently have to be analyzed 
against the background of statements from leading politicians and 
party programs.
The analysis of the SD policy on the radar issue is 
primarily focused on the debate in 1987 when the major discussions 
took place. There has been very little controversy on this issue in 
1988/89
10: The 4 party Conservative/Liberal coalition government cd
1987 faced a majority on security issues. Now this so called "alter­
native majority" has crumbled. The Danish government now consi^ 
of a 3 party Conservative/Liberal minority government.
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"What is clear above all is that the profusion 
of proposed NUTS (Nuclear Utilization Target 
Selection) approaches has not offered an escape 
from the MAD world, but rather constitutes a 
major danger in encouraging the illusion that 
limited or controlled nuclear war can be waged 
free from the realities of a MAD world. The 
principal hope at this time will not be found 
in seeking NUTS doctrines that ignore the MAD 
realities but rather in recognizing the nuclear 
world for what it is and seeking to make it 
more stable and less dangerous" ( ) .
CHAPTER TWO :
WARNING AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE:
This chapter seeks to provide some conceptual 
clarification before the six questions will be adressed in the 
following chapters. The purpose is to discuss the two key concepts 
"warning" and "deterrence". For this purpose the chapter is divided 
into two parts. In the first part, the importance of warning in the 
nuclear age will be discussed. It will make a distinction between 
attack warning and attack assessment, as well as a distinction 
between tactical and strategic warning. The second part deals with 
the concept of nuclear deterrence. The early and main present 
positions in the current debate are presented.
A) THE IMPORTANCE OF WARNING IN THE NUCLEAR AGE.
11 :J. B. Harris and E. Marcusen (ed): "Nuclear weapons a
the threat of nuclear war", (Harcourt Brace 1986): Spurgeon M. Kee*?y 
and Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky: "MAD versus NUTS: can the doctrine or
weaponry remedy the mutual hostage relationship between the super­
powers?", p. 109.
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One note of distinction needs to be made before dealing 
with the importance of warning in nuclear strategy. Generally a 
distinction is made between strategic and tactical warning. These 
concepts are used differently in various connections, and it is 
therefore useful to emphasize the meaning attached to them in this 
paper. Tactical warning is used to describe warning of an "executed 
attack" i. e. a situation where missiles or bombers are on the way 
towards the US or allies. In contrast, strategic warning refers to 
warning of impending attack before it actually takes place. When 
the term warning is used alone in this paper, it is used in the 
sense of tactical warning. Further, attack warning essentially 
means determining that an attack on North America or it's allies is 
taking place, while the more difficult task of attack assessment 
involves identifying the types of threat involved, i. e. the 
origins, the scale of attack and the probable targets.
In recent years the increased focus upon the importance, 
function and vulnerability of the nuclear warning systems has 
resulted in several critical studies(12). In these studies it has, 
among other features, been shown how essential warning is for the 
survival of parts of the strategic triad and decisionmaking 
hierarchy (political as well as military), and thereby also for the 
whole credibility of deterrence by retaliation. Some have even 
suggested, that the weaknesses in the attack warning system are so 
severe as to tempt military leaders to adopt a first strike
12: See for instance P. Bracken: "The command and control
nuclear forces", (Yale 1983); D. Ball: "Can nuclear war be control 
led", (Adelphi Paper No. 169, IISS London 1981); R, N, Lebow: Nu­
clear crisis management - a dangerous illusion" (Cornell 1986),
D. Ford "The button" (London 1985).
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strategy, on the theory that a first strike from the Soviets would 
render the system inoperative and make retaliation impossible(13). 
Therefore, a great deal of discussion has centered around how to 
improve the US warning system.
If the potential adversaries of the US know that it is not 
possible to penetrate the US airspace undetected, they will be much 
less inclined to strike first. As Edward C. Aldridge (Under 
Secretary of the Air Force during the Reagan administration) ex­
pressed it:
"The tactical warning and assessment functions 
have become critical in a modern world where the 
consequences of a surprise can be 
disastrous" (14) .
Two scenarios can be to some use here in illustrating the 
importance of warning systems. Both assume that the Soviets are 
able to penetrate the US airspace without the US being aware of 
this. Firstly, a nuclear strike against command, control and com­
munication (C3) centers could have the implication that the US re­
taliation would be limited since it could be cumbersome to get the 
launch orders out to the necessary forces (the part of the nuclear 
forces which is submarine-based is of course created exactly with 
the purpose of countermanding this threat). This type of "de­
capitating" first strike would only be realistic if it was possible 
to penetrate the US warning systems without US knowledge. Of course 
the US has taken different measures against this type of scenario; 
for instance, "The Airborne Command Post". Bruce Blair argues that
13: For a good analysis, see for instance W. Slocombe t.n
"Managing nuclear operations", (edited by Ashton B. Carter, Brook­
lyns 1987) chapter four; D. Ford: "The button", op. cit.
14: Air Force Magazine, February 1985 p. 64.
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the C3I system always has been the weakest link in the US strategic 
nuclear posture (15). He argues that further improvement of the C3I 
system is necessary for nuclear deterrence.
The second scenario/example could be a strike against 
the US strategic retaliatory forces. Again it is assumed that the 
Soviets would be able to find a weak spot in the US warning system 
and thereby beat it. If the Soviets had the hard-target capability 
and the sufficient anti-submarine warfare measures, this could again 
mean that the US retaliatory forces (no matter the enormous 
destructive power) would have very little credibility. A disarming 
first strike would be possible assuming that these conditions were 
met.
These hypothetical scenarios give some credence to the 
importance of the present warning systems. It will later be shown 
that the effectiveness of various warning systems' ability to 
detect, track and assess an executed attack is essential for the US 
strategic policy of "nuclear warfighting".
Two general features in the development of the US warning 
system's structure will have to be briefly mentioned here. The 
first is the vertical integration of the military intelligence and v 
warning systems(16). The nuclear forces are now closely connected 
to the specialized intelligence organizations. The creation of 
North American Air Defense (NORAD) was the first step in this 
direction. The second element is the horizontal integration,
15: Bruce Blair: "The command and control of nuclear forces'
(Brooklyns 1985), pp. 4,5,282,283,285,288.
16: P. Bracken, "The command and control of nuclear forces'
(Yale University press 1983), p. 18.
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whereby nuclear forces in geographically dispersed areas have been 
integrated into a single centralized command (17) .
The main reason for the vertical integration was that the 
time pressure became more pronounced with the advent of ICBM's and 
especially SLBM's. To retain an assured capability to retaliate 
(and in this way to deter a potential aggressor) it was necessary 
to have information and organizations ready to go to war 24 hours a 
day. The main emphasis was put upon defense against a surprise at­
tack, since no other start to a nuclear exchange seemed to be 
likely. The horizontal integration came about as a consequence of 
the increasing complexity of the nuclear forces. Instead of having 
3 arms with different goals etc, a more centralized management was 
needed (18).
17: Ibid p. 7.
18: It has, however, been questioned how successful these at
tempts have been; see for instance D. Ford "The button" op. cit. 
in which it is argued that the US Air Force and the US Navy 
different strategic goals and doctrines. See also Ted Greenwood. 
"Making the mirv" (Cambridge, Mass. 1975), pp. 51-82.
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B) NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR STRATEGY:
Almost as long as nuclear weapons have existed, there has 
been intense debate over the US nuclear weapons policy or nuclear
19strategy ( ). While most people agree on the broad objectives of
deterrence (2°), the consensus disappears when the question of how 
to achieve it arises (21). Some have advocated that nuclear war 
should be avoided at all costs, while others have argued that under 
certain circumstances, a nuclear war with the Soviets (or any other 
enemy) could be limited, controlled and maybe even won. This part 
of the thesis provides the main arguments in the current strategic 
debate. The discussion will of course have to be somewhat crude due 
to the limited space. This is especially true when considering the 
amount of literature which the subject has produced. An important 
delimitation here is that it should be recognized there is not only 
one, two or three theories, doctrines or policies of nuclear 
deterrence. On the contrary there are whole series of them which
19: In discussions of nuclear strategy and policy differed
distinctions are used. The distinction between acquisition, deploy 
ment and employment policies is used by for instance Warner R. SchiL 
ling in "US Strategic concepts in the 70's" in International Securg r^ty 
6,No 2 (Fall 81). The more used distinction between actual and Ö6 
claratory policy refers to what cleavage there may be between wVi^ l 
politicians refer to as the US strategic goals and the actual pol<Cy 
as it can be reflected by acquisition, employment and targetpUnv 
(employment policies).
20: The definition on deterrence as used here is taken frovr\
Leon V. Sigal:"is the aim to convince a potential adversary tb&l 
the risk of seeking political objectives by military means is pro 
hibitively high", p. 97 in "Deterrence in the 1980's", edited ty 
R. B. Byers (Croom Helm 1983).
21: Pauline Kerr: "Nuclear deterrence, the joint Australian/U^
facilities and the Hawke Labor Government",p. 6, Forthcoming AltCd 
and Unwin, Sydney Australia.
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differs between countries and even government departments (22). The 
task of this part is just to present the main conceptions.
In some way, the main positions on todays nuclear strategy
23debate ( ) stems or are derived from the debate started in the
late 1940's when Bernard Brodie wrote:
"Thus far the chief purpose of our military has 
been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must 
be to prevent them. It can have no other useful 
purpose" ( ).
Brodie's view was that it was illusory and dangerous to 
pursue traditional military goals as victory in a nuclear war(25). 
Nuclear weapons could only be used to prevent general war, not win 
it.
22: For one analysis of this aspect, see D. Ford, op. ciL
concerning the rivalry between the US Air Force and US Navy, 
this analysis it is argued that the USAF strategic doctrine, 
resembles preemption, where the US Navy is closer to an assured 
destruction position.
23: This discussion is limited to the arguments, which sees
the deterrence as a credible concept. Several researchers have pro 
duced excellent analyses on the lack of credibility of deterrence 
as a foundation for the global strategic stability. See Robert Jer­
vis: "The illogic of American nuclear strategy", (Ithaca and Londco 
1984) v
24: B. Brodie: "The absolute weapon", (New York 1946) p. 74.
25: Jeffrey D. Porro: "The policy war: Brodie vs. Kahn"on
"Nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear war", edited by J. 
Harris and E. Marcussen (1986 Harcourt Brace, Javanovich Publik 
ers), pp. 90-96. It should be noted that Brodie did not altogether 
mean that nuclear weapons could not be used in a limited way. 
argued at different times in favor of a counterforce strategy And 
of tactical nuclear weapons, D. Ball in letter to me 4 april 19^ 
The idea with the description of the main positions here iso-f 
course somewhat schematic. In "Strategy in the missile ac)£ 
(Princeton 1959) he discusses counterforce, while "Escalationc?aö 
the nuclear option" (Princeton 1966) discuss the use of tactitAl 
nuclear weapons; D. Ball in letter to me 20 July 1989.
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Brodie's strongest opponent, Herman Kahn, did not agree 
with the view that limited nuclear war was necessarily out of the 
question. This stemmed from a different conception of deterrence 
and of what was needed to deter a potential attacker. Kahn argued 
that the US should preserve the possibility of a limited nuclear 
war. For Kahn, the scenario where the US strategic forces were 
attacked by the USSR, would result in a choice between "oblivion or 
surrender" if Brodie's recommendations were followed (26) .
Brodie's views have later been termed "deterrence by 
punishment" or "assured destruction", while Kahn with the emphasis 
on flexibility and certain options available to policy makers have 
been labeled "nuclear warfighting" or "deterrence by denial".
The main positions today are to a great extent derived from this 
previous debate. On the one hand (the assured destruction group), 
there is the group which argues that it is not technically feasible 
to fight a limited nuclear war. Further, it is argued, that to pre­
pare to fight such a nuclear war may make the use of nuclear 
weapons more likely, thus increasing the risk of a catastrophe, 
which would be impossible to control. This group therefore argues 
that strategic offensive forces and related C3I targets require 
only sufficient survivability to allow a small number of preplanned 
retaliatory strikes. Flexibility in relation to employment policies 
is on this basis argued to be relatively little.
The basic argument against this conception of a credible 
deterrence has been, that it is insufficient to protect allies as
26 : Ibid. p.93.
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the West Europeans. The argument is, that it is not credible that 
the US should be willing to defend Western Europe if this meant 
that there was a high risk of sacrificing the whole population of 
the US. Flexible Response as an Allied strategy was the reaction in 
the latter part of the 1960's to the fact the Us was becoming in­
creasingly vulnerable to the USSR strategic deterrent. Secondly, it 
is argued that if the USSR is working on creation of the ability to 
fight limited nuclear wars, then the US also needs this capability 
to posit a credible deterrent.
Therefore, there is the group of strategists (27), who 
argues that the US should be able and prepare to fight a limited 
nuclear war. Only then would a potential aggressor be deterred, 
they advocate. This group advocates what can be termed "warfighting 
strategies". There are of course different basic opinions within 
this group. One of the most straightforward and extremist experts in 
this group, argue that only by being able to dominate escalation 
and confrontation at all levels of conflict, and thereby win a nu­
clear war (deterrence by winning), can the US policy makers expect
28their threats to affect the adversary ( ). Other proponents of
warfighting strategies argue that less than being able to dominate 
a conflict (escalation dominance) would be sufficient for a 
credible deterrence. The argument is that a nuclear war cannot be 
won.
27: A prominent member of this group of strategists is Collin 
Gray who have been very outspoken on this issue, see for instance, 
"Nuclear strategy, a case for a theory of victory" in "Strategy 
and nuclear deterrence" edited by Steven E. Miller (Princeton 198H/
28 : C. Gray op. cit.
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However, proponents of nuclear warfighting strategies 
argue that an enduring C3I system is of extremely high importance. 
For instance, in order to be able to respond proportionately during 
the nuclear war, early warning sensors, which provide data on 
magnitude, targets and source of attack, would be crucial for the 
success of such a strategy. In other words attack warning and 
assessment data will have to be of high standards if decisionmakers 
wants to be in control of the situation - avoid unwanted 
escalation. It is in this relation that the modernization of Thule 
will have to be seen.
The basic difference between the three main groups 
(assured destruction, warfighting and warwinning), which are crude 
and schematic illustrated here, seems to be in the understanding of 
the concept "deterrence"; especially in regard to the question of 
what is needed for credible deterrence. The trade-off between a 
credible deterrent and stability seems to be the heart of the
29arguments( ). There seems to be different conception of what the
enemy would be prepared to risk or lose in a superpower 
confrontation. One could perhaps ask, as Brodie did, what political 
goals could justify the loss of maybe millions of human lives as 
even a limited exchange would result in.
So far the discussion or presentation of the strategic 
debate has had a tendency to put strategist into two or three 
"boxes". To show that it is not quite easy to put the current
29: Leon V. Sigal: "Stable deterrence or nuclear warfightinuj
in "Deterrence in the 1990’s" edited by R. B. Byers (Croom 
1985) pp. 96-115.
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nuclear strategists in either of these "boxes" a quote is helpful:
"..it is difficult to argue that the United 
States should not have any capabilities for 
controlling escalation in the event of a nu­
clear exchange. It would be imprudent for the 
United States to foreswear its capabilities on 
the grounds that they contribute to warfighting 
strategies - when those capabilities could be 
desperately needed in the event of a nuclear 
exchange so as to ensure that there was some 
means of exercising some control" (3°) .
To sum up this part of the discussion, a small and quite 
schematic table can be of help for the subsequent discussion:
TABLE 1: DIFFERENT POSITIONS ON STRATEGIC DETERRENCE:
1) Ass. Destruction 2) Warfighting 3) Warwinning
MAD. *ASS. DESTR. *DAM. LIMIT. *COUNT.VAIL. *NUC. WÄRWIN.
%-------------  Flexibility in nuclear options, -------------  +
Demands on the C3l-system.
MAD: Mutually assured destruction 
ASS. DESTR. : Assured destruction.
DAM. LIM: : Damage limitation.
COUNT. VAIL. : Countervailing.
NUC. WARWIN. : Nuclear warwinning. (31)
30: D. Ball: "A base for debate" (Sydney 1987) p. 88.
31: Examples of the positions are: C. Gray "fit" in under No.-
clear warwinning, B. Brodie was often close to assured destruction* 
Schlessinger (former US Secretary of defense) under countervailing- 
R. McNamara (also former US Secretary of Defense) is difficult to 
place since he at different times argued in favor of an assured 
destruction position in the bureaucratic battle with the USAFIn 
relation to budgets. However it is probably most appropriate-to 
conclude that in the 1960 and 1970's he was close to damage limit* 
tion (mild form of war fighting), while in the 1980's he has movep 
closer to an assured destruction position.
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The above figure illustrates the discussion of the 
different positions on strategic deterrence on a one dimensional 
basis. The idea behind the figure is to provide a frame for the 
subsequent discussion of the radar modernization and the SD position 
on nuclear deterrence.
During the early years of the Reagan administration the 
need for a flexible employment/targeting policy was carried further 
than the previous administrations policies (the development of the 
strategic policy is, nevertheless, incremental). During the early 
years of the administration's first term in office there was a 
great deal of speculation whether the actual policy was one with a 
closer resemblance to the more extreme warwinning position. In 
other words closer to the Gray position. The administration 
backtracked and did several occasions state that "A nuclear war 
cannot be won and must never be fought" (32) . It is of course 
difficult to know whether this covers only the declaratory policy 
or whether this is also the actual policy. It is beyond the scope 
of this paper to discuss this aspect. The main point is that the 
administration's position on deterrence is a warfighting posture' 
(probably more extreme than the previous Carter administration).
For the purpose of this paper, it is further important to 
realize that the warfighting position on deterrence, as one of the 
preconditions, has a strengthening of the C3I systems. A position 
with an emphasis on nuclear warfighting would place far larger
32: "The national security strategy of the US", January 190$
(The White House) p.15.
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weight on attack assessment than the minimum deterrence position. 
The minimum deterrence position would regard attack warning as 
sufficient. General Randolph from the USAF expressed this during 
testimony to the US Congress:
"The credibility of our national defense policy 
of nuclear deterrence and escalation control 
are critically dependent upon our ability to 
provide unambiguously, timely, reliable and 
survivable warning and assessment of enemy mis­
sile attack". (33)
During the last years 'of the Carter administration, a 
greater emphasis on enhanced endurance and survivability of the C3I 
system was initiated (34).At the core of PD-59 was the reasoning 
that since the USSR doctrine or strategy recognized the need to 
fight a nuclear war (it was assumed that the USSR had such 
intentions and capability), the US needed a comparable capability 
in order to maintain the credibility of its deterrent across a full 
range of options.
The Reagan administration continued this trend, and in Reagans 
"Strategic Modernization Plan" the improvement of the C3I system 
had a very high priority (35). The next chapter will therefore look 
at the reasons for the modernization of the radar and it will be
33: 18 March 1983, Senate Armed Service, Subcommittee on sti<7 
tegic and theater nuclear forces, p. 2477. See also H181-84.5 p.4A?> 
444 (16 april 1985)
34: D. Ball: "US strategic forces" in International Securitliy
Winter 1982/83 (Vol 7, no. 3) p. 241.
35: D. Ball: "US strategic forces" p. 241, op. cit. In th0
article it is argued that the strategic C3I system is still extreme 
ly vulnerable.therefore: "The boundary of control in any military
exchange (as compared to demonstration strikes) is unlikely to ( 
beyond either a few days or a few tens of detonations)
argued that the purpose was to enhance warfighting capabilities. 
This will be done after a short description of the US early warning 
system.
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"Attack assessment, as an extension of warning, 
has received attention only since the 19701s 
(when the idea of nuclear options for measured 
responses began to take hold), and substantial 
support only in the 1980's"(3 ).
CHAPTER 3:
THE RADAR, THE WARNING SYSTEM, THE MODERNIZATION AND NUCLEAR 
STRATEGY:
The previous chapter provided the background for a more 
comprehensive understanding of the issues as raised by the decision 
to modernize the installation at Thule. This chapter now seeks to 
answer the two first of the questions as posed in the first chap­
ter :
1) What is the role of the radar at Thule in the US 
Ballistic Missile Warning System?
2) What was the rationale for the recent modernization, and how is 
this related to various conceptions of nuclear deterrence?.
The purpose is to provide an analysis which can be used in 
the following chapter, which discusses the claims in relation to 
Thules role in SDI/ALPS, ASAT warfare and arms control.
The chapter is divided into three parts. Firstly, the 
present US ballistic missile warning system is described. Secondly,
36: J. C. Toomay: "Warning and assessment sensors" in "Managi 
Nuclear Operations" edited by Ashton B. Carter (Brooklyns 198l), 
p. 321.
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the modernization of the radar installation is analyzed. Finally, 
the role of the installation in relation to various conceptions of 
nuclear deterrence is discussed.
A: THE PRESENT US WARNING SYSTEM AND THULE:
The best way to illustrate the US warning system and 
thereby the role of Thule in this connection is to look at the way 
different Soviet nuclear weapon systems could threaten the US. By 
doing so, the various parts of the warning system designed against 
strategic attack can be explained. The Soviet strategic triad con­
tains ICBM's, SLBM's and bombers carrying cruise missiles.
The launching of Soviet ICBM's would initially be detected 
by the Defense Support Program (DSP), which currently consist of 3 
satellites in geosynchronous orbit. (37 )
37: This satellite system is currently being modernized and
replaced by more modern satellites, see AWST. 23 January 1989 p 
34; AWST. 20 February 1989 p. 34.
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Figure 1: The DSP satellite coverage.
,70°W
Source: D. Ball : "A base for debate", (Sydney 1987) p.17.
The DSP positioned at 69 degrees East would be the first 
link in the US warning system detecting a Soviet ICBM launch. It' 
would do so by detecting the energy emitted by the ballistic missile 
during the boostphase ( ). After the boostphase the DSP system is
no longer able to track the missile and other warning systems would 
have to take over.
The new Over The Horizon Radar (OTH) at Alaska would probably
38: D. Ball: "A base for debate", (Sydney 1987) p. 21. S0p
also AWST 20 February 1989, p. 40.
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detect a large scale Soviet ICBM attack before the radar at Thule 
and other US ground based sensors(39). The figure below show the 
coverage of the US OTH radars:
Figure 2: Over The Horizon radar coverage:
Source J. C. Toomay, in "Managing nuclear operations" edited by A. 
B. Carter (Brooklyns 1987) p. 295.
The OTH radars are created for the purpose of detecting 
bomber and cruise missiles, but are also capable of providing some 
warning of ICBM attack due to the loctaion and coverage of the
39: D. Ball in letters to me 20 July 1989 and 4 April 198°) 
The OTH radar has a number of deficiencies which make it S 
reliable in relation to warning in the arctic areas, see below 
this information.
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radar. However other radar are better able to provide better attack 
assessment.
It is exactly in relation to ICBMs that the radar at Thule 
has an important function. By far the largest number (if not all) 
Soviet ICBM’s would "go over" the northern ice cap to hit targets 
in continental US (CONUS). This is simply because the path across 
the northern ice cap is shorter than any other way. It is important 
here to emphasize that by far the largest proportions of Soviet 
strategic warheads are land based. Roughly 60 % of all Soviet
40strategic warheads are deployed in this way( ) . This gives a good 
indication of the geo-strategic importance of Thule.
The radar at Thule is a part of the Ballistic Missile 
Early Warning System (BMEWS). There are three stations which make 
up the BMEWS chain : Thule in Greenland; Clear in Alaska and
Fylingdale in England. Another station, Cobra Dane in the Aleutians, 
serves as a backup station for the BMEWS chain, while at the same 
time performing an important role in monitoring Soviet missile 
tests in the latest parts of their trajectory.
Figure 3 shows this system and the planned coverage after 
the modernizations in Thule and Fylingdales, England:
40: D. Ball: "Australia and the global strategic balance*
(Canberra, ANU, 1989), p. 46.
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Figure 3 : The planned BMEWS coverage.
Source : Defense Electronics Aug. 85 p. 96.
The BMEWS serves as the third link in detecting a Soviet 
ICBM launch(41). The system in this way performs the important 
function of verifying a Soviet attack initially detected by the DSP 
satellite (69 degrees East). This is termed the "dual 
phenomenology", i.e. the fact that the US gets confirmation about 
ballistic missile attack from more than one source. The last phase
41: In some instances would Thule be performing the role
"second link" - it depend^ upon place of launch, target in the US ? 
and scale of attack.
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of the warning system for Soviet ICBM's are the radars stationed on 
CONUS. These consist of, for instance the Perimeter Acquisition 
Radar Attack Character System ( which also performs a "gap-filler 
function" for the BMEWS system - in case a SLBM is launched from a 
little area not covered by the BMEWS chain) and in certain 
instances also the Pave Paws radars on CONUS, which coverage is 
shown in figure 4:
Figure 4 : PARCS and partial Pave Paws coverage.
Source : Defense Electronics, August 1985 p.100.
To recapitulate: the DSP system detects the initial launching 
and is only able to detect and track the ICBM's in the boostphase, 
the OTH radar is second link in most scenarion while the BMEWS are
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the third link and detect and tracks the ICBM's after roughly 10 mi­
nutes of flight and only in the midcourse; finally, the PARCS and 
the Pave Paws tracks the ICBM’s in the last part of their flight. 
The whole flight takes 25-35 minutes depending upon place of 
launch, trajectory and target in the US.
If the threat is Submarine Launched Ballistic 
Missiles (SLBM's), and the place of launch is off the US Atlantic 
or Pacific coast, the first "bellringer" is again the DSP system. 
Figure 1 showed the DSP positioning of satellites, and it can be 
seen that a SLBM launched from the Pacific would be firstly detected 
by the DSP satellite stationed at 134 degree's West, while a SLBM 
launched from the Atlantic would be discovered first by the DSP 
satellite positioned at 70 degree’s West. The OTH radars on CONUS 
would serve as the second link while the Pave Paws radars would be 
the third line of warning.
If the Soviet threat were to use bombers and low flying 
cruise missiles (ALCM) to hit the US, the DSP system would be 
unable to detect the initial launch. The BMEWS chain could at the 
same time be avoided by flying very low and therefore under the 
beam of the different radars (these are not "over the horizon 
radars" - OTH radars). The recent upgrading of the Distant Early 
Warning (DEW) line, now called "The North Warning System", have 
taken place just to meet this new threat. It consists of 13 
minimally manned radars and 39 unmanned radars across Canada and
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Alaska (42). The PARCS, Pave Paws and several OTH radars serves 
as the backup function to confirm or reaffirm the information 
initially provided by the DEW line.
The well known false alarms in the NORAD computers such as 
the result of a failure of a chip (1980) and the inadvertently 
loaded disc (1979) showed the value of the various independent 
systems. Within a few minutes, the sensors were checked and since 
no information confirmed the warned attack, NORAD established that 
no attack was actually taking place (43).
B) THE MODERNIZATION OF THE RADAR AT THULE:
This part of the chapter deals with six aspects of the 
modernization. These are: the general rationale for the 
modernization, the early warning and assessment capabilities, 
spacetracking capabilities, the economy, weaknesses in relation to 
the installation and finally the transmission of data to CONUS.
B. 1 : the general rationale for the modernization
The general explanation for the need for modernization of 
the Thule radar installation given by the US Air Force (USAF), is 
that improved missile technology and increased threats from the 
Soviet side made the upgrading necessary.
In a statement to the Senate’s Committee on Armed 
Services, General J.V. Hartinger ( Commander in Chief NORAD) said 
that:
42: General Kutyna, during testimony to House of Represen
tatives’ Armed Services Committee, 21 March 1985 p.981.
43: D. Ball: "A base for debate" p. 68. op. cit.
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"The BMEWS modernization program includes an 
improvement of the Missile Impact Predictors 
(MIP) which will replace pre- 1960 vintage 
computers with modern high speed systems. 
Further, an enhancement of the BMEWS tracking 
radars will allow discrimination of smaller 
targets, so that we can accurately count 
incoming warheads and have increased tracking 
capability" ( )(emphasis added)♦
This statement shows that the purpose was to better be 
able to track and assess incoming missiles i.e. information beyond 
simple attack warning. The previous chapter showed that a detailed 
attack assessment etc is a precondition for the present US nuclear 
strategy of warfighting. It is therefore clear that the rationale 
for the modernization had some background in the perceived need to 
enhance warfighting capabilities.
Before the modernization, the Thule radar served as a 
kind of tripwire to alert the decision makers in the US that an
4 5attack was on the way ( ) . In this way bombers could be sent into
the air and alert messages (or orders to launch) could be sent out 
to other parts of the strategic nuclear forces.
The BMEWS were built in the late 1950’s, an era where a 
major missile attack was 20 missiles and not much more, and before
MIRV's (Multiple Independent targetable Reentry Vehicles) were
\
invented. The system was built to detect large rocket bodies of 
single warhead missiles. One of the implications of this is that a 
major attack of possibly hundreds of missiles would overload the old
44: Senate's Committee on Armed services, 12 March 1982, p.4699,
45: Lt.General Kelly Burke in Senate's Committee on AppropriQ 
tions, 18 April 1980. During this testimony, he said that the Ok! 
installation was used primarily for "tactical warning and very li­
mited attack assessment of ICBM and SLBM attacks" p. 1676.
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system, since the technology was not appropriate for these 
scenarios. It has been argued that hundreds of missiles could show 
up on the screen as only one missile due to the "bad resolution"of 
the old radars, and the radars were not accurate enough to predict 
targets or launch locations in a useful manner (46). Further, 
there was the problem of decoys and reflective "chaff" intended to 
confuse radars. If the Soviets intended to attack the US they could 
"hide their warheads" in between large numbers of decoys and chaff. 
This would complicate attack assessment and characterization.
The new Large Phased Array Radar (LPAR) will have 2 sides, 
each scanning 120 degrees azimuth for a total coverage of 240 
degrees. The former radar (AN/FPS-50, which was the scanning radar, 
and the AN/FPS-49 which was the tracking radar) had a coverage of 
160 degrees. This means that the new radar has got a significantly 
greater coverage now that it also has the ability to look back upon 
the Atlantic and part of Northern CONUS. In addition to this, the 
beam has a greater length than before. The beam will now be able to 
reach approximately 300-400 kilometers longer. This means that the 
actual area coverage of the BMEWS installation at Thule is now 100% 
larger than before (see figure 4 and 5 below for this information).
\
The type of radars called LPAR's are very powerful 
instruments compared to the old installations at the BMEWS sites. 
The old radars form their beam optically by reflecting 
electromagnetic energy of the dish like a spotlight and then steer 
these beams mechanically by turning the dish. The LPAR's work much
46: D. Ford: "The button", p. 75. and J. C. Toomay in "Managing 
nuclear operations", op. cit. p. 296.
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more efficiently - they form their beams by adjusting the phases of 
numerous small sources of electro-magnetic energy which are called 
elements (47) . Where these phases add up, a beam forms. The beams
can then be steered by simply changing the relative phases of the
elements.
The great advantage of a LPAR radar is that the phases
necessary for steering the beams to any arbitrary position can be
precalculated, and stored in a computer, then called upon to switch 
the beams anywhere within the coverage in a few microseconds. The 
scanning is almost instantaneous and without inertia. The ability 
of the LPAR to perform multiple functions in a short time and under 
pressure of many incoming objects makes them far more efficient 
(,8).
B. 2 : Reliability, early warning and assessment:
The old system for tracking objects (AN/FPS-49) after the 
detection by the radar (AN/FPS 50) is also upgraded, because the 
new radar is far better able to detect larger number of objects
49(and smaller objects) ( ). The reason for the improved ability to
discriminate smaller targets which are close together is to be
50found in the changing of the radar bandwidth ( ). The new radar
will according to AWST be capable of detecting and tracking missile
47: The radar has got 2,560 active elements in each face.
4 ft: J. C. Toomay, op. cit. pp 299, 308.
49: J. C. Toomay p.307.
50: C3I Handbook 1986, p.108. And Ashton B. Carter: "Ballistcc 
missile defense", (Brooklyns 1984) p. 70.
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targets 10 square meters in size at a range of 5000 kilometers
(51).
Each of the faces/arrays of the new Thule radar is about 
26 meters in width and breadth and each contains 2,560 active 
elements (52). According to AWST (53), the system can lose at least 
5% of the active elements before performance is affected 
significantly. This means that the reliability of the LPAR is far 
better than the old radar. If the old radar had one faulty high 
power tube, the system would fail. The new scanner is electronically 
steered and has no mechanically steered parts as in the old radar. 
This means that it is less vulnerable to the very hostile arctic 
climate. The frequency of the new radar is probably the same as 
used by the old radar, but is has not been possible to obtain 
information about this specific figure (54) .
The coverage of the old radar and the new is shown in
figure 5
51: AWST 9 December 1985, p. 52.
52: The radar has a potential for further improvement. Thu=>
is due to the passive elements which in case they are activate 
would increase radar performance. It is generally said that increas­
ing the number of elements by 60 % quadruples radar performance. 
In other words would a factor of four upgrading reduce the detec­
table radar cross section from 10 square meters to 2.5 square meters 
at a distance of 5000 km. Put differently, it would make a itof'e 
detailed attack assessment and characterization easier. See J.C. 
Toomay op. cit. p.307, for a discussion of these aspects.
53: AWST 20 August 1984 p.91.
54: Janes Weapons Systems 1987-88 (Londonl987), informs th<?t
the new installation at thule in many ways is similar the Pave 
installations in CONUS. One can therefore assume that the frequency 
is also the same: 420 -450 MHz. this is the same as the old installa­
tion and is considered to be the frequency used by early warning 
radars: see DE November 1987, p. 25. Low frequency for a radar meJnS 
that it is best suited for search functions, while a frequency whv.cn 
is higher means that it is more useful for tracking purposes , A. 
B. Carter "Ballistic missile defense" p.70.
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FIGURE 5 Coverage of the Thule BMEWS radar before modernization
Before modernization
After modernization
SOURCE : Defence Electronics, August 85 p. 96.
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The figure does not give an exact picture of the coverage 
of the radars, because the LPAR's are not working in the same manner 
as the OTH radars. The OTH radars has beams which bounces of the 
ionosphere and thereby are capable of following the curvature of 
the earth. The principle of OTH radars is pictured in figure 6
Figure 6: OTH radar principle
neliaclion/Refieciion
Ionosphere
100 km
Range~1,200 km
Receiver
Ionosphere
230 km
Transmitler
Target
Receiver
Source : J.C.Toomay p. 290.
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The beam of the BMEWS is shown in figure 7, where it is 
clear that the beam does not follow the curvature of the earth:
Figure 7: BMEWS radar principle
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Source : J.C. Toomay p. 298.
The implication of this, is that the area of coverage for 
the BMEWS as shown in figure 5 is somewhat deceptive, since the 
radar beam at the maximum 3000 nautical mile range would be some 
1000 miles above the earth (55). The implication of this is that the
55: PE August 1985 p.96. D. Ford in "The Button" p. 134 op. 
cit. informs that at a distance of one thousand miles, anythirtj 
flying at less than 129 miles above the Earths surface would 
undetected by early warning radars.
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LPAR at Greenland, Thule, will not be able to track any Soviet 
ICBM's until after the boostphase because the beam searches an area 
above the launching pads. It is only after the ICBM has finished 
the boostphase and post boost (bus deployment) phase that the 
Thule radar will be able to detect and track the missile, it's 
warheads and decoys.
In the event of an SLBM attack it is a little more compli­
cated since the result depends upon the distance from the Thule 
radar. However it is clear, that the closer the place of launching 
the better able the Thule radar is to detect any launching in the 
early phase of the missile's trajectory. If a SLBM is launched 
close to the Kola Peninsula it is clear that the radar will be 
unable to detect the missile until after the boostphase.
The limited coverage of the radar to 240 degrees in 
azimuth makes it virtually impossible for the radar to be useful 
for information about the late midcourse and terminal phase. 
Since there is only a very limited ability to look back upon CONUS 
(see figure 3) and the same argument as described above concerning 
maximum range and curvature of the earth is valid, it cannot be 
useful for information about the flight of missiles in this late
\stage of the trajectory. Other radars will have to perform these 
functions, for instance PARCS and Pave Paws (56).
In 1983 the missile impact computers were replaced. 
Instead of the 25 year old IBM 7090's, new CDC Cyber 170-865 
processors were installed (57). These should make it easier to
56: The OTH radars will not be very useful for information on
the terminal trajectories due to the "skip zone", which means tK?t 
there is a distance of several hundred kilometers out from the radlr 
in which no reflections are possible. D. Ball in letter to me 4- 
April 1989. See also J. C. Toomay op. cit.
57: AWST 9 december 1985, p.54.
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predict both impact point and place of launch.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the increased 
importance of the Polar Sea for the Soviet submarines has made the 
modernization of the radar increasingly important, since ballistic 
missiles launched from these submarines would be detected by the 
radar fairly early. The DSP satellites is now able to detect 
launches from the far North (58). The role of the Kola Peninsula in 
this regard as a home port for a large proportion of these SLBN's 
is evident (59) . With the rise of the Northern Fleet and the
ability of Soviet submarines to traverse under the polar ice, there 
was, clearly perceived by the US military, a threat from such 
submarines in both the Arctic and Northern water areas, yet the one 
area that lacked a radar with the capability to detect and track 
SLBM's was that covered by Thule. Therefore, it can be argued, it 
was perceived that an upgrading to the standard of the Pave Paws 
was needed. A quote from a hearing in the US Congress supports this 
notion. In explaining the present ballistic missile surveillance 
system and the rationale for the modernization of the Thule radar, 
General Kutyna said:
"As you can see in these southern sectors, a 
submarine could be in either of these or in 
these Northern regions near the poles, launch a 
missile which would impact on the United States 
and not be detected by any of the existing
58: The DSP system probably have a over the horizon viewiACj 
capability, which allows them to detect launches from the far Nor4h 
See D: Ball: "A base for debate" p. 28, op. cit.
59: Politiken, 22 December 1986, 2. section p. 3. "Jordens st0’r* 
ste militaer base" by Harald Hamrin.
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systems" (60) .
B. 3 : The radar and spacetracking:
The new LPAR will have a coverage of 85 degrees in 
elevation and thereby have some space tracking function as well 
(61). It is interesting to look at the US spacetracking system and 
the role of the radar at Thule in this system because it has been 
claimed that Thule could be an essential part of a US ASAT warfare 
program (see next chapter).
Up to 30,000 observations a day are made by the US in 
order to chart present and future orbital paths (62); there are 
5,600 plus man-made objects in space (63). Different surveillance 
systems have been created to monitor these movements. The 
Ground-based Electro-optical Deep-Space Surveillance System 
(GEODSS ) was designed to monitor satellites in deep space 
(satellites from 3000 nautical miles and onward, geosynchronous 
orbits and highly elliptical orbits). Five tracking stations are 
presently operating at White Sands,New Mexico; Maui, Hawaii;
Tagaeu, South Korea; Diego Garcia and finally another station in
\
60: House of Representatives's Committee on Armed Services,2 \ 
March 1985 p. 991. See also AWST 23 January 1989 p. 34. The 
generation of DSP satellites now have a OTH capability and is iD 
this way capable of detecting launches from the near the poles.
61: Aviation Week and Space technology (AWST), 20 August 1984
p. 91.
62: Defense Electronics (DE), July 1982, p.82 and SIPRI Year­
book 1987 p. 66. Of these are 5 % operational payloads; 20 % Are 
non-operational payloads; 25 are mission related debris; and ^ o'7e 
are from satellite break ups.
63; DE July 1982, p.82.
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the Eastern Atlantic (64).
In addition to these radar/tracking stations, there are 
several systems for detecting and tracking satellites in lower 
orbits. Among these are the BMEWS, Pave Paws, Cobra Dane and the 
"NAVSPASUR" (the Navy's system). Space surveillance is essential 
because, if it is unknown what the Soviets are sending up, it is 
very difficult to know the purpose of their programs. Further, if 
the US does not know what else is in space, they cannot know how to 
respond in case it becomes necessary. It is therefore important to 
catalogue objects early in their orbits (65) . This is to examine 
every launch and determine every ephemeris. Also data about mission 
payload can give information about mission and status of satellite. 
Finally, activity in space is constantly monitored to predict, 
confirm and report any space object that could survive the r 
e-entry into the earth's atmosphere. This is important since 
reentering objects can look like ballistic missiles to sensors. The 
prediction of the reentry make a more correct interpretation of the 
data from the warning sensors possible (66)
It is not easy to get information about the capabilities 
of the Thule radar in relation to the space tracking mission (other 
than ballistic missile detecting). However, Defense Electronics' 
informs that
64 : DE: July 1982, p. 83. The last station is somewhere ^
Portugal according to DE August 1985 p.104.
65: According to AWST 14 January 1985, the USSR launched <2
satellite (Cosmos 1.603) on 28 September 1984, which undertook 
extensive maneuvering and the US Space Defense Operations Center- 
lost track of it several times during the maneuvers. Thule couU 
have played a role in monitoring this spacecraft or in similar instances
66: D. Ford: "The button" p. 85.
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----- "the BMEWS and the Pave Paws also perform
space and surveillance functions, and together 
with Cobra Dane, NAVSPASUR and Eglin FPS-85 
(Located in Florida) "they form the backbone of 
the spacetrack system” ( ).
It is therefore clear that besides yielding information
about tactical warning and pre-impact assessment, the BMEWS performs
an important space tracking function. The data is relayed to NORAD's
Space Defense Operations Center (SPADOC), which has the task of
following all manmade objects in space. During testimony in the US
Senate it was informed that Thule is part of the newly created
68Space Command's sensors ( ):
"These are the worldwide locations. Sensors in the new Space Command that extend from Thule to 
Australia, from Korea to Turkey” ( )
Even though the radar probably cannot give precise 
information about different object's positions in space, it can 
provide information about direction and speed, which gives 
indication about the type of orbit. When the orbit is roughly 
known, more sophisticated instruments can be used to give the
67: DE August 1985 p.103, i. e.this was before the moderniza­
tion took place. One would assume that these capabilities must 
increased quite a bit after the modernization. AWST also inforns 
that the new radar as: "...having an inherent capacity to per fern
spacetrack mission as well as provide early warning", 20 Aug,
1984, p. 91.
68: SPACE COMMAND: See AWST 11 February 1985 pp. 60-62; AW5>T~
6 April 1987, pp. 73-76; AWST 30 March 1987, pp. 83-84; AWST 25 
1987, p. 50; AWST 9 December 1985, p. 67-73 and DE January 1W& 
p. 80 for a description of the structure of Space Command.
69: Testimony during hearing in Senate Committee on Armed Ser 
vices, 20 March 1985 p.4262. It is not all Space Command assets 
which are part of the SpaceTrack system. The Space Command Station 
at Nurrungar, Australia is not part of the SpaceTrack system; 
Ball in letter to me 20 July 1989.
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position at a certain time. As such, a brief outline of the 
capabilities in regard to space tracking functions has been 
discussed.
B. 4: The economy and the modernization:
Another point deserves to be mentioned about the reasons 
for the modernization, namely that the installation is cheaper to 
operate after the modernization. The modernization to a LPAR instead 
of just an upgrading of the existing radar would almost be cost 
effective, while at the same time increase the capabilities of the 
radar enormously.
Before the modernization power consumption was an average 
of 8.6 Megawatts (MW), while after the installation was finished 
should decrease to 2.4 MW (7°).
During testimony to the US Congress in 1980, Lt. General 
Kelly H. Burke (The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, 
Development and Acquisition) explained that the considered 
modernization of the radar would not be to LPAR standard for three 
reasons : Costs, longer implementation time and possible violation 
of the ABM treaty (71). When the decision to modernize the radar 
was taken three years later, the price of a LPAR had become price 
competitive and it could, on technical grounds, have been difficult
70: AWST 20 august 1984 p.91.
71: Lt General K. burke in Senate *s Committee on Appropriations 
18 April 1980 pp. 1675-77: "The phased array approach, which would
provide roughly equal capability, has been rejected primarily toe- 
cause of the substantially higher costs, the longer implementation 
time and the potential ABM treaty conflicts of a phased array deployment *
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to resist the modernization (72).
B. 5: Weaknesses at the Thule radar installation.
The installation at Thule has certain weaknesses. This is 
important since it could be a USSR target in the early phases of a 
potential confrontation. In order to perform the expected mission 
(to supply NORAD with relevant information) two criteria will have 
to be met. Firstly, that it is possible to obtain relevant informa­
tion and secondly that the information can be transmitted to NORAD. 
Since all radars are more or less vulnerable to nuclear explosions 
(for instance Electro-Magnetic Pulse or EMP) (73), this could be
one of the ways the Soviets could "blind" the US eyes. Other ways 
to interfere could be by jamming or spoofing the installation 
(74). An attack upon the radar station by conventional weapons 
could easily do enough damage (radars are very soft targets) to 
interfere with the ability to obtain the relevant data. This goal 
could be accomplished easily by the Soviets by using one or a few 
of their conventionally armed short range missiles; for instance a 
sea-launched cruise missile. It is a generally accepted fact that'
72: Arms Control Today (ACT), March 1987 p.9: Raytheon's offer* 
for the construction of the LPAR was now cheaper, while at the 
time a qualitative improvement.
73: See for instance D. Ball: "Can nuclear war be controlled*
p.10-12. 50 psi would probably be enough to destroy the install
tion. the effectiveness of EMP hardening on radars is very difficucr 
to be sure of, since this cannot be tested for large buildings; 
see DE November 1987 p.69. See also A. B. Carter: Ballistic Miss»l*_ 
defense" p. 54, op. cit.
74: See J. C. Toomay op. cit. p.314-16, and D. Ford "The but­
ton" , pp.73-74.
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the USSR would place a high priority towards C3I targets in early 
stages of a conflict (75).
Even though the LPAR is still able to perform it's 
function of collecting data, this still needs to be communicated to 
the NORAD headquarters at Cheyenne Mountain Complex, Colorado. To 
quote Defense Electronics :
"without communication, sensors can detect, but76cannot warn" ( ).
The radar site at Thule is linked to NORAD/SPACE COMMAND, 
National Military Command Post at the Pentagon, and SAC at Offutt 
AFB, Nebraska with cable, tropospheric scatter communications 
systems and Satellite Communications (SATCOM) (77). It also seems
certain that the radar will be connected to the military head­
quarters in CONUS by the new system for communication: MILSTAR
(7ö). If these links could be disturbed in one way or another, 
thereby making transmission of data cumbersome or impossible, it 
would to some degree negate the utility of Thule ( 79 , 8 0 ) In this 
way Thule would only serve the function as a "bellringer”, since it 
would be unable to provide attack assessment and characterization.
In other words, Thule would only be able to provide attack warning.^
75: D. Ford pp. 67,73.
76: DE January 1986 p.84.
77: There is a SATCOM terminal at Thule now, which presumably
uses the Satellite Data System (SDS). D. Ball in letter to m£ H 
April 1989.
7 fl: AWST 3 April 1989, p.62.
79: PE January 1986 p.86.
80 : House of Representatives Armed Service Subcommittee on
Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems, 21 march 1985, p.1009-la.
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B. 6: Transmission of data to CONUS:
Warning and assessment data are transmitted to NORAD,
National Military Command Post at the Pentagon, and SAC at Offutt
81AFB, Nebraska ( ). Simultaneously, the National Military Command
Center at Pentagon starts a missile display conference with the 
NORAD and SAC command posts. It is the task of the NORAD commander 
to quickly tell all concerned whether the detected launch is a 
threat or not.
The SAC commander at Offutt, Ne. exercises the command and 
control of land-based bomber and ICBM forces and in this way the 
intelligence function is separated from the function of executing 
an attack. This organization is to some degree a reflection of the 
experience during the Korean war where the two tasks (although not 
managing nuclear weapons) were performed by the same organization 
with unsatisfactory results (82).
At the same time, NORAD is also responsible for the 
surveillance of space, to keep track of manmade objects in space, 
and several agencies have been created for this purpose in the last 
few years. One is the Space Command which was a result of a direc­
tive from Pres. Reagan on 30 November 1984. The operation of the 
radar installation at Thule is under the authority of this agency.
ft 1 : AWST 20 august 1984 p. 87; AWST 11 February 1985, pp. 6 0 - 
62; DE January 1986, pp. 80-89; DE August 1985, pp. 86-108; Air Force. 
Magazine February 1985, pp 63-67.
82: P. Bracken op. cit. p. 55.
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C) THULE AND US NUCLEAR STRATEGY
As mentioned above, the initial justification by the USAF 
for the modernization of the installation at Greenland, was that new 
Soviet missile technology (smaller warheads, decoys. MIRV’s, chaff 
etc) have made it necessary to upgrade the more than 20 year old 
installation. As the US defence strategy shifted from one of 
massive retaliation upon attack to one of nuclear warfighting ( ),
and as the Soviets developed the ability to threaten US ICBM's with 
MIRV technology, the need to track smaller objects has become 
apparent. General Davis (SAC commander, and principal military 
officer in charge of both preparing and executing US war plans) 
said:
"The kind of retaliation the US would respond
with depends on the magnitude of the attack,
and our tactical warning and assessment system
is very good. It can give you the size of that
attack and about where that attack is coming,
and based on that information, the President 
and his advisers - and I am one of those 
advisers - are able to talk to the President, 
and the President makes the decision"
( )(emphasis added)
83 : This took probably place in the early sixties; see D. Ball' 
"Targeting for strategic deterrence" (Adelphi paper No 185 II$S 
London 1983). Warfighting strategies of some kind have therefor 
had a place in the US nuclear strategy since the Kennedy Presidency 
In this part of the paper the term "warfighting" is used as 4 
quite broad category, i. e. from milder forms of warfighting to 
more extreme "warwinning" version, see Chapter Two for the 
detailed discussion. Other people would probably use more defined 
categories of the concept, but for the purpose of this analysis, it 
should be sufficient with this terminology.
84; From D. Ford, "The button" p. 44 (Interview with Generdi 
Davis) .
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When looking at various warning systems for strategic 
nuclear forces in relation to the necessary information they are 
supposed to provide, three "variables" are important:
* whether they can provide information about the source of attack,
* the scale of attack,
* and information about the likely point of impact ( ) .
It is obvious that it is crucial to gain information about 
the source of attack, because the retaliation, hopefully should be 
directed at the source (the attacking country) itself. Secondly, it 
is important to know where the missiles are launched from because 
this can give information about the type of ballistic missile/mis­
siles which are coming. It is also perceived as important for the 
US strategy of warfighting to know which silos are empty and which 
are not. The SS-18's, which are launched from reloadable launchers, 
are among the Soviet nuclear weapons perceived as the most 
threatening by the US, and in a warfighting strategy, retaliation 
against these would probably have a high priority.
It is important to assess the scale of attack since the 
retaliation is to have an appropriate size in order to control 
escalation.
Finally, it is important to know what sort of target^ 
(the likely point of impact) the adversary is trying to hit - 
whether it is population, C3I or strategic forces. Again, in a 
strategy emphasizing controlled escalation, this is crucial for a 
determination of the retaliation : the scale and which targets.
The DSP system can generally give the information about the 
source of attack and is thereby the single most important source
85: D. Ball "A base for debate", pp. 24-25. op. cit.
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of this information. It is possible to give very precise 
information about the missile type on the background of this 
information, because the Soviet ICBM's are deployed in "fields".
For instance, SS18's are located in six fields in South-Central 
USSR and the SSll's are deployed around the Urals and in three 
locations near the Mongolian border. There is in addition to these 
fixed based systems the new problem of land and rail mobile ICBM's, 
but it will not be addressed here (86). The DSP is able to locate 
the place of launch within + /- three nautical miles, which is 
sufficient to determine for instance whether it is a SS11 from the 
Svobodnyy field or a SS18 from the Zhangiztobe field etc ( ) .
To determine the scale of attack/impact points and to 
decide on a "suitable" response is not quite as easy as obtaining 
the initial information about source of attack. The DSP system gives 
fairly accurate information in scenarios which involve smaller 
scale attack, but quickly becomes saturated after this (88). It is 
here that Thule and other ground based radars have an important 
function.
The improved detecting and tracking capabilities at Thule
make it possible to estimate a large number of objects in a trajec-
\
Q £L : See ACT No 7 Vol 17, September 1987, p. 34 for a descrip­
tion and possible problems. However, one thing should be mentioned. 
It is that the trend towards mobile missiles makes it more difficult 
for the DSP system to provide information about the type of missile 
launched, this could perhaps increase the in assessment of attack. 
On the other hand, the DSP might still be able to perform this fuOC 
tion optimally on the basis of booster characteristics. See AWST Zo 
february 1989 p.40.
: D. Ball: "A base for debate" p. 25.
88: D. Ball : "A base for debate", p. 25. op. cit.
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89tory ( ) . It is therefore interesting to look at the reasons for
the modernization as expressed by the US Air Force as expressed 
during testimony to the US Congress.
The explanation for the request of funds for the 
modernization was:
MWe want to determine the accurate magnitude and 
probable effect of the attack in progress so 
that our selected response is appropriate. To 
achieve better attack assessment, we are 
developing the capability for more precise 
tracking and improved data processing to 
provide better pre-impact assessment in support 
of critical, time sensitive National Command 
Authority (NCA) decisions" (emphasis added). 
Statement by USAF General Bernhard D. Randolph (90) .
The underlined part of the statement illustrates why the 
upgrading was necessary. If this did not take place, the US politi­
cal/military decision makers would be clearly handicapped in deci­
sions about how to retaliate, because they would not have enough 
precise information about the attack under way i. e. information 
concerning scale of attack and point of impact. This 
interpretation is fully compatible with the official strategy of
"nuclear warfighting", by which it is sought to convince potential
\
enemies, that no matter what sort of attack they might engage in, 
they will always be worse off later.
89 : The present radar at Clear, Alaska, which is the same type 
of radar as Thule before the modernization, is able to predict impact 
points within two miles. This attack assessment is important -fo*" 
determining a proportionate US response. It can be argued that Thule, 
would be able to perform even more efficiently in this regard af^r 
the modernization, see AWST 1 August 1988, p. 65.
90 : 18 March 1983, House of Representatives's Committee on
Armed Services p. 2477.
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This was also expressed in a different way during 
testimony to the US Congress by General Hartinger in 1982:
"BMEWS radars were designed to just detect a 
raid and say the "missiles are coming" to 
support the national policy of massive retalia­
tion in the 60’s. And, the radars could do that 
by tracking [DELETED] . Now they must not only 
report that the "missiles are coming" but also 
tell the NCA where they are coming. To do 
that, the sensors must be able to see [DELETED]" 
(91).
This shows that attack assessment was the reason for the 
modernization. And it should be noted here that this capability for 
attack assessment is only appropriate for nuclear warfighting stra­
tegies as argued in chapter two.
It is, however, fairly clear on the basis of the above
92argument ( ), that the modernization would still not make a perfect
assessment capability possible. It is not possible to discern bet­
ween decoys and warheads until the reentry phase (93). When decoys 
reach the reentry phase they start to burn up in the process and
91: Senate Committee on Armed services 12 March 1983, p. 469^. 
See also Clive Archer: "US bases in Greenland", Cooperation JryN
Conflict Vol. XXIII, 1988, p. 133 where Harold Brown is cited -Ai*- 
the following:
"Programmed improvements of the Greenland BMEWS radars wdt 
produce better estimates of attack size and impact points"
92: A. B. Carter: "Ballistic missile defense" pp. 52, 60- 62.
op. cit.
93: A lot of research is currently being done in the US pre­
sently on this problem. See for instance AWST. 3 April 1989 p. 26.
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therefore obtain a different flight pattern (94) . Thule will not be 
of any specific use at this late stage, but can only give an 
indication of the impact point by using the missile impact predic­
tion computers. The radar would after the modernization, be able to 
give a more detailed picture of an attack than the old radar, but 
would not be able to give an exact picture. The DSP could of course 
give the first rough assessment, and Thule would then be able to 
add to this information, while the PARCS and Pave Paws would be 
able to track the warheads when they reenter the atmosphere and 
thereby obtain a different flight pattern from the decoys, which 
start to burn up. Finally, would NUDET sensors on board DSP and 
NAVSTAR satellites be able to detect nuclear detonations and 
provide the more detailed information.
A statement made by US Air Force General Kutyna (who was 
Director of Space Systems and Command, Control and Communication)- 
illustrates the role of ballistic missile warning systems for the 
US nuclear strategy. In an answer to a question by US Congressman 
Mr. Kramer in a hearing in the US House of Representatives, he 
explained that the US ballistic missile warning system (95) had a 
certain battle management capacity :
\
"Yes, Sir. Do our ballistic missile early
94: John Pike - in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, 12 April 
1985 p. 13 - describes an LPAR radar as able to distinguish between 
reentry vehichels and decoys. I assume that he is implicitly refer 
ring to this above mentioned situation: when decoys starts to bam 
up in the reentry phase and thereby obtains a different flight pat­
tern. See also Bhupendra Jasani, "Satellites for arms control dnA 
crisis monitoring" (Oxford 1987) pp. 9, 78-82. and A. B. Carter
"Ballistic missile defense", p.69, op. cit.
95: I assume that this is both the DSP and the BMEWS systems
which are included here.
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warning systems have a battle management
capability in them ? Yes, Sir. To the extent 
that they can tell you how many missiles are 
coming at you and the general area at which 
they are launched. And therefore you can tell 
whether they are going after your strategic 
forces, whether they are going after your 
communications centers or after your cities. 
And based on that information, to know how many 
are coming at you and where they are going, 
first of all you could flush different portions 
of your forces, you could move your National 
Command Authority out of the way.
On the other end, however, (DELETED) and 
therefore, you could retarget your forces so 
that you do not hit empty silos. If you know 
which silos they have launched out of, you can 
only go after the full ones if you want to. So 
in that extent you have a battle management 
capability, yes" (96) .
The above quotations reflect the official doctrine of 
"nuclear warfighting", which in other connections have been termed 
flexible response. The goal is to have the ability to respond and 
prevail at any level of conflict. The USAF has clearly expressed 
that this was the aim of the US nuclear strategy. General Hartinger 
(Commander of the USAF Space Command) expressed this clearly on 18 
November 1983 in an address to the USAF Association :
"The (DSP system) satellite early warning 
system .... is tied into the warfighting 
structure" (97)
The crucial point concerning these quotations would be to 
see the exact function of Thule in relation to the US warfighting 
structure. It has been established that Thule cannot be used as the
96: I assume that this includes both the BMEWS and DSP systems 
House of Representatives's Committee on Armed Services 21 March 
1985 p.996-97.
97: Taken from D. Ball "A base for debate" p. 74 op. cit.
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best source for determining the source of attack (DSP does this
98much more accurately ( ). It is also apparent on the basis of the 
above, that Thule has got a role in the estimation of impact point. 
The use of the missile impact prediction computers helps in provid­
ing information about impact points in the US.
The primary role of Thule is therefore to detect and 
track objects (both decoys and warheads) in the midcourse and 
provide both attack warning and attack assessment (scale of attack). 
The main reason for the modernization will probably have to be 
found in the increasing emphasis on attack assessment. This emphasis 
became clear as attention shifted away from strategies of sheer 
retaliation to strategies that attempt to match response to attack. 
It should be noted that full information about an attack would 
probably not be possible to achieve until after impact (if even 
then) .
To sum up the chapter, it can therefore be said that the 
general structure of the US warning system is geared into a dual 
phenomenology; the purpose of which is to obtain information from 
more than one source at the same time. Early warning satellites 
generally detect the initial launch, while different radar system^ 
later confirm or reaffirm attack and information about missile 
attack. Thule performs three main functions;
1) attack warning (dual phenomenology).
2) attack assessment and characterization (dual phenomenology).
98 ; One can argue that Thule provides a "redundancy capacity 
for the whole system, and therefore is perceived as important 'in 
this regard.
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3) space tracking.
The warning and assessment capabilities are especially 
relevant in relation to Soviet ICBM's, and SLBM’s launched from the 
Arctic Ocean.
99The background for the modernization ( ) was mainly to be
found in a perceived need to enhance (pre-impact) attack assessment 
and characterization capabilities.
The modernization of the C3 system was clearly rooted in a 
nuclear warfighting strategy, which is extremely dependent on a 
properly working C3 system. Without a working C3 system, it is 
very difficult to believe in "escalation control" or even 
"escalation dominance". In other words, without a very good and 
survivable C3 system, it would take little time before control and 
command over nuclear forces in a confrontation would be lost.
The chapter also demonstrated that the modernization had 
some background in the need to cut operational costs. Finally, it 
was shown that the radar had certain weaknesses. It was argued that 
the radar could easily be attacked by the USSR, which is believed to 
attach a high value to targeting C3 installations. If transmission 
of data to Space Command was made cumbersome or impossible this'
99 : It is probably difficult to argue with a great deal
certainty, which of these factors was the most important for 
modernization decision. One could argue that the need for enhance 
attack warning and assessment was the primary motive. However, 
cost aspect could just as well have been a very important faefo^  
for the final decision. Likewise it could be argued that the U£Af 
wanted to upgrade the installation due to bureaucratic intere^l^ 
(they knew that the strategic modernization program had a high pri­
ority on C3I systems, which meant that it could be easier to obttl'n 
funds etc). This brief analysis shows that it is difficult to use. <2 
"Rational Actor Model" in this case. See G. Allison "The essence of 
decision" (Harvard 1971) for one description of the model.
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would negate the utility of Thule in relation to warfighting capa­
bilities .
\
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"United States of America’s construction of a 
LPAR at Thule is a direct violation of the ABM 
Treaty ( ) .
CHAPTER FOUR:
_____________THULE, SDI, ASAT AND ARMS CONTROL:_____________________
In the beginning of 1987 a vigorous debate evolved in 
Denmark as a result of several articles in the independent 
newspaper "Information". In these'articles and in the parliamentary 
debate in March 1987 (101), it was claimed that the modernization
of Thule was violating the ABM treaty; that it was possible that 
Thule would be an important part of a later US SDI or ALPS project, 
and further that Thule could become a part of US Anti Satellite 
(ASAT) warfare.
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part 
of this chapter will look at the role of Thule in different kinds of 
SDI projects. The second part will discuss Thule in relation to 
ASAT warfare. The final part of the chapter will look at the role 
of the installation in regard to the ABM treaty and arms control.
The current debate about the Soviet radar at Krasnoyarsk in Siberia 
will also be mentioned briefly in respect of its relevance to the 
Thule installation.
100: Memorandum from the Soviet Department of Foreign Affairs
concerning the Thule installation, delivered to the Danish Charge 
d ’Affaires in the USSR on 4 February 1987.
101: See Folketingets Forhandlinger 3 March 1987.
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A) THULE AND SDI.
"A radar for Star Wars?"(102); "Radar at Thule can be 
used in anti missile defense" (103); "Lockheed confirms Thule 
radars role in anti missile defense" ( ) - these were some of the 
headlines in Danish newspapers during 1987. This part will discuss 
the validity of claims such as these, i. e. if post modernization 
radar could play any significant role in a future US SDI system.
In discussions about the current US SDI project, it is 
important to discern between systems intended to protect population 
and systems for "point defense" i. e. for the protection of 
strategic forces, command centres etc. There seems now to be 
general agreement about the very limited feasibility of creating a 
SDI project for general population defense (105). Presently, three 
layers of defense are being discussed in the US: boostphase,
midcourse and terminal defense (106). This distinction is also used 
in this paper. It is difficult to assess the new Bush 
administration's position on strategic defenses, but it seems 
certain that it is committed to some kind of SDI project. The more 
precise architecture and weapons mix are not yet known. Foi*
102: Aarhus Stifttidende 30 August 1987, p. 1 in part 3.
103: Information 13 February 1987.
104: Information 
4 March 1987.
105 : Reports from the Department of Defense indicate that tk^. 
population defence as outlined under President Reagan is no longer- 
considered seriously. See Washington Post 27 March 1988.
106: Harold Brown (Editor) "The strategic defense initiative“ 
(Colorado 1987), p.121.
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instance, the speculations on the first phase deployment mix of 
weapons and sensors varies constantly. The paper will therefore 
have to adopt a more general approach in the discussion of Thule 
and a future SDI system. An attempt will be made to explain the 
role of the radar installation in relation to the different layers 
of defense and the weapon systems which seems presently most 
relevant in relation to Thule.
There is general consensus about the necessity of 
intercepting Soviet missiles in the boostphase, if an ABM system is 
intended to have a high degree of efficiency (107). At the 
boostphase the missile is still relatively large, moves relatively 
slowly, has not yet released decoys and warheads, and the booster 
emits a brilliant flame which makes it easier to detect and track.
If it is not possible to intercept a very high proportion of 
missiles during this phase (108), defense with a relatively high 
degree of efficiency is impossible. In case a large number of 
missiles get clear of the boostphase defense, they will be more 
difficult to deal with for several reasons. One is that the 
missiles will be able to release warheads, chaff and decoys which 
makes the number of objects to detect, track and destroy much 
larger. The difficulties in discerning decoys from warheads are 
discussed below. Another reason is that the objects will be smaller 
and move faster. If all warheads are not intercepted in midcourse 
they will continue to the terminal phase, where an effective
107: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) "The fallacy of stjr 
wars", (Vintage Books NY 1984) p. 40.
108: According to UCS p. 57 at least 90 %.
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defence against incoming warheads is virtually impossible,
109especially if it is intended to protect population ( ) . This is
due to the possibility for the adversary to let warheads explode if 
they are intercepted and thereby create intolerable damage. A 
"salvage fused" warhead would still destroy its target if its yield 
is sufficient (110).
It has been argued above that the Thule radar even after 
the modernization was unable to detect and track ballistic missiles 
in the boostphase (unless it was SLBM’s launched very close to the 
installation, which is somewhat unlikely). The radar would 
therefore not play any part in a boostphase ABM system. The DSP 
system, if upgraded would be more likely to perform this mission 
unless space based sensors of some sort can be developed for the 
purpose ( ) .
If a boostphase system is not likely to be effective to 
deal with all launched missiles, an additional system will have to 
deal with the "escaping" warheads and decoys. This has been termed 
a midcourse defence system. The obvious questions to ask here is, 
could Thule play a role in this concept?. The midcourse sys-
109 : Thule could be a part of a "deceptive basing" or "radJr 
proliferation" deployment mode for a terminal defense; see A.C*>. 
Carter "Ballistic missile defense" p.65-66. op. cit.
110: UCS p.47 op. cit.
111: See Signal, July 1985 p. 29 and ACT June 1987 pp. 2-8
concerning research in relation to the Boostphase Surveillance^ 
Tracking System, and the Spacebased Surveillance and Tracking Sy 
tern. See also US Dept, of Defense, the Strategic Defense Initiative 
1985 report pp^ 34-35. See also AWST 23 January 1989 p.34 and A 
20 February 1989 p.34 for a description of the modernization of -the 
DSP system. The current system of satellites is gradually beintj 
replaced by a new generation.
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tem/defence has two options: either to be able to distinguish bet­
ween decoys and warheads or to try and intercept all of the 
objects. It is very difficult to discern between the decoys and 
warheads in the midcourse since all objects in space follow 
identical ballistic trajectories, irrespective of their mass and 
drag characteristics (112). The implication of this, is that in 
case it is not possible to make this distinction, every object will 
have to be intercepted ( ). If the boostphase system is not
highly effective, the demand upon sensing devices and battle 
management capabilities quickly becomes overwhelming (114) .
The obvious answer to this question is to attempt to 
create new sensing devices, which can tell decoys from warheads
115( ). The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) is
working on these issues and is considering various technologies. 
Among these are: infra-red sensors, spacebased radars (operating
above 100 GHz and approaching looo GHz(116), and ground based 
radars(117).
112: I will not go into details with the obvious counter mea­
sures, see UCS pp. 115-28. Also DE February 1987 pp. 74-78 fo** c? 
short discussion of these objections. See also A. B. Carter "Ballis­
tic missile defense" p.77-78. op. cit.
113: UCS p. 130 op. cit. '
114 : The SSTS works under SDIO are presently working on these 
issues. See ACT June 1987 pp. 2-8. And AWST 3 April 1989 p.26.
1 1 ci: Signal July 1985 and DE August 1985 p. 108 briefly 
discusses future possibilities. One of the problems with a space 
based surveillance system is the price. If the system it is to haue 
better capabilities than Thule or similar sensors, the cost woui£ 
be enormous.
116: See Air Force Magazine November 1987, p. 44.
117: See AWST 11 January 1988 pp. 22-23: "The ground base3
radar remains a viable candidate for the midcourse sensor role 
the SDIO deliberated on a proper mix of midcourse sensors for^t
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These new kinds of sensors would make Thule more or less 
obsolete in view of the present modernization, in relation to the 
whole project (118). There seems however to be some doubt about the 
likelihood of these projects succeeding in a shorter time perspec-
119tive ( ). It will at least take some years to fully develop these
systems. Another possibility is that Thule is modernized and 
upgraded again, but it is outside the scope of this paper to deal 
with this possibility.
Further, it is also very unlikely that the US would have 
an essential part of a SDI project in such a vulnerable place as 
Thule (* ). A conventional attack upon the installation would be
very easy, and thereby negate the utility of the radar. The base 
itself is manned by a very few US servicemen, who would be able to 
mount only a very limited defense of the base if an adversary was 
determined to destroy it.
It is, however, necessary to ask if Thule would play any
role in a more specific weapon system for point defense or a defense
for protection against accidental or unauthorized launch (ALPS) 
-------------------- \
itinitial strategic defense system, an SDI official said last week*
118 : One could perhaps argue that Thule could provide "haojs
offs" for the more sophisticated sensors. But even this task wouiA 
probably be limited.
119 : The SDIO has claimed some progress in this area, but no 
real results have been revealed to the public.
120: The often cited Nitze criteria (to be effective again-st
countermeasures and to be cost effective) would not be fulfilledtn 
this case. The obvious countermeasures would be cheap and easy.
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121( ) if this was to be deployed in the near future. If this was to
be deployed in the short term before sophisticated sensors were
fully developed, perhaps Thule could be of some use?. During the
past year, the debate in the US about an early deployment of a
limited SDI/ALPS system has among other features focused upon a
122system currently being developed by Lockheed ( ). The system
(kinetic kill vehicle technology) developed by Lockheed is intended 
to intercept Soviet (or other attacking) warheads in the mid course
123phase. It is the so called ERIS ( ) (Exo-atmospheric Reentry
vehicle Interception System) missile with the HOE (Homing Overlay 
Experiment) warhead, which in the latest part of the flight is 
automatically seeking the attacking warhead. The system was first 
announced by the Pentagon on 7. Nov 1985, and it was argued that if 
the program is accelerated, the deployment of a force of 100 
interceptors could be accomplished within five years. Such a force, 
proponents argued, could provide a partial defense against enemy
1 74ICBMs and SLBMs ( ).
It is therefore necessary to ask what role Thule would 
have in the Pentagon's push for an early deployment of an SDI/ALPS 
project. It seems that the above argument concerning the Thule 
radar's limited ability to discern between decoys and warheads id
121: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, June 1988, p. 12;
ACT December 1988, p. 25.
122: AWST 19 January 1987 p.22: "Weinburger approves ...". AW^r
16 March 1987 p. 73. ACT June 1987 pp. 2-8; ACT October 1988, p.25.
ACT, November 1988, p.26.
123: The version tested at the moment, and the one expected to
be used in a early deployment system (if this is accepted by
US Congress) is called FTV - Functional Test Vehicle.
124: Report from Lockheed released on 2 March 1988 concerning 
the ALPS.
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125also valid here ( ). Since it is not possible to make the dis­
crimination, all objects will have to be intercepted. With respect 
to this requirement, it is interesting to ask where this 
information about the objects should come from. Thule seems to be 
performing an important function in this area because of the 
location of the radar and the present absence of more sophisticated 
sensors. The location is an especially important factor since 
information from sensors would have to come early for a ground 
based interceptor to be able to intercept in the mid course phase. 
Thule is one of the only sensors, which currently would be able to 
provide this time urgent information (126).
Information from Lockheed promoting the ERIS system ex­
plicitly shows that Thule is considered as one of the essential
127sensors for the ALPS. In a report ( ) released to several US Con­
gressmen, it states that Thule would perform "the warning and 
precommit functions". Lockheed assumes that the passive elements of 
the Thule radar would be made operational in about six months. 
However this would be far from effective against possible Soviet 
countermeasures, which would still be cheap and easy. This was 
clearly demonstrated by T. A. Postol from Stanford University’s 
Center for International Security and Arms Control in two reports'
to Congressman Charles E. Bennett on 8 February and 15 March 1988 
128( ). Postol argues that even after the activation of the passive
125: See T. A. Postol letter to US Congressman C. E. Benneii
dated 8 February and 15 March 1988.
126: Staff report submitted to US Senators W. Proxmire and 
Bennett Johnson; released on 8 April 1987.
127 : Lockheed information released on 2 March 1988.
128 : See also AWST 4 April 1988 p.41.
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elements of the radar, it would be just as difficult for the radar 
and other present technology to make any useful discrimination 
between decoys and warhead as if
’’one was depending on a 35 millimeter camera to dis­
criminate between suitcase bombs and normal luggage at 
an airport” (129)
However, Lockheed is still promoting its system in the US 
Congress, where it has a certain interest among policymakers (i3°).
It should of course be noted that the project is private, even 
though it is funded by the SDIO. No decision to accept the system 
for an early deployment has been taken.
In the light of this information, it is interesting that 
the Danish resolution passed in the Folketing in March 1987 
stipulated that the installation was not to be used for any SDI 
project. It should be emphasized here that the above outlined 
project (Lockheed is operating with several projects: some are ABM
Treaty compliant, others which not) would not necessarily be a 
violation of the ABM treaty since the treaty permits one ABM site 
with exactly 100 interceptors (131). It would be difficult for 
Danish policymakers to argue that Thule was not to be used in rela­
tion to a system (ERIS) which is only at the research and develop-
129 : p. 7 in the longer version of the letter dated 8 Februa
1988.
130: The proposal was presented to a Senate Armed Services
Subcommittee in March 1988 for the first time, AWST 4 April 1^ 2$ 
p. 41.
131: Lockheed operates with several different models for dn
early deployment system. One system is in accordance with the 
treaty.
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132ment stage ( ) . The real test for Danish decisionmakers would
come if the US decided to go ahead with the deployment of such a 
system, in which Thule was to be one of the sensors ( ).
B) THULE AND ANTI SATELLITE WARFARE :
In the 1987 debate which raged in the Danish newspapers, 
it was claimed that the installation could be used in relation to
132 : It can be said here that the aerospace companies always
are producing proposals such as this, and therefore it is difficult 
for the decision makers in Denmark to have an explicit stand on 
this issue so early in the process.
\ It is, however, more important to ask what the implies 
tions would be if the US seeks to deploy a much less than perfect 
SDI/ALPS system. There is widespread agreement in the arms control 
community that a system with the aim of generally protects 
population would be destabilizing (besides probably technically 
impossible). There is a little more uncertainty with respect to j 
system for protection of strategic forces. It has been argued 
a less than perfect system also could be destabilizing since ct 
could take care of a "ragged" second strike in the aftermath of <2 
first strike. On the other hand, it has been argued that a limited 
system could enhance strategic stability if it was to protect 
strategic forces since this would secure a retaliatory capability. 
The ALPS in its very limited structure could still have serious 
consequences for strategic stability. The interceptors, as sug­
gested by Lockheed, would for example have a certain ASAT card 
bility . If it is useful in relation to strategic missiles, thenck 
could be even more effective against the much more vulneravM^ 
satellites in lower orbits. Testing the ERIS interceptors wouiA 
therefore not be in agreement with the Congress three year ban on 
testing of ASAT weapons.
Another critical issue is how the Soviets would perceive a US AL1^. 
If a more developed ALPS was to be developed and deployed, trhe 
Soviets would surely argue that they themselves should be allows 
more than the present ABM site around Moscow. Taking t1*0 
consideration the different geographical and other factors for su<n 
an understanding, it could prove very difficult to come to a firtül 
agreement between the superpowers.
A last point is that the danger of accidental or unauthorized 
launch might be fairly exaggerated by the proponents of AL/S. 
During the more than thirty years with strategic delivery systems 
there has not been one single accidental launch. It can therefore 
be argued that the resources spent on an ALPS could be better u ^  
in other ways. One could perhaps imagine other nuclear scenario1) 
which are far more likely. Among these could be terrorism ore? 
conventional conflict escalating into nuclear confrontation.
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ASAT warfare. One headline was: "Thule radar shall also be used in
ASAT warfare against Soviet satellites" ( ). This part seeks to
assess these claims.
The increased use of space for both civil and military 
purposes ( ) has resulted in enhanced efforts to provide precise
information about objects in different orbits around the earth. The 
US and the USSR are now to a much higher degree dependent upon 
satellites for surveillance, tracking and communication. While the 
US. satellites are generally stationed in outer orbits, the Soviet 
satellites are stationed in lower orbits which makes them more 
vulnerable in potential ASAT warfare (136).
Having established, in the previous chapter, that the new 
Thule radar is capable of performing certain spacetracking 
missions, it is necessary to ask what this means substantially. In 
other words, what is the range/coverage of the tracking/detection 
radar, and how important is this in relation to Soviet and US low 
orbit satellites. The answer to these questions is, of course, 
interesting in relation to the increased emphasis on measures to 
"negate" (official US terminology) satellites in orbit if this 
should become desirable in some sort of crisis or lower level 
conflict. Further, it is important to be able to monitor if any 
potential adversary is trying to interfere or intercept your own 
satellites. The purpose of ASAT therefore is to hit an adversary’s 
command and control functions in a potential conflict; this sort of
1 34 : Information 3 February 1987.
135: A specific distinction is not really possible because
some military satellites can and are used for civil purposes c W  
vice versa.
136136 : UCS p.194.op. cit.
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conflict could either be conventional or nuclear. If one could 
disturb communication, submarine navigation and collection of 
intelligence etc. of the adversary, one would be ahead in the 
conflict other things being equal. The considerations concerning 
ASAT warfare were clearly expressed during testimony to the US 
Senate:
’’For Space Defense we turn to the F-15 program.
If there were a satellite threatening our space 
craft and a decision were made to take it out, 
or if there was a Soviet satellite providing 
support to ground forces and we decided to 
negate that, decision would be passed to the 
Operations Center at Cheyenne Mountain” ( ).
It is however important to emphasize that satellites (and 
the tracking of them) also have a stabilizing purpose. The military 
early warning systems are the keystone in deterring nuclear 
attacks. No adversary to the US or it's allies would be able to 
launch a nuclear attack without the US military being aware of it. 
The same principle applies to other satellites, which give 
information about the other side's forces etc. It is only when 
satellite detecting/tracking capabilities are coupled with an ASAT 
capability it could become destabilizing. '
Both the US and the USSR currently have programs under 
development for performing the task of "negating" satellites, or 
meeting the threat towards their own satellites. The US program is 
the ASAT weapon (MHV = miniature homing vehicle) launched from a 
F-15 plane in the air (138). The Soviet effort is concentrated upon
137 : Committee on Armed Forces, Subcommittee on Strategic and 
Theater Nuclear Forces, 20 March 1985, p.4270.
138: UCS pp. 202-205. op. cit.
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a system of ground launched missiles, which goes into orbit after 
launching, homes on it’s target satellite by radar, and it's 
warhead then explodes, destroying the target with pellets ( ).
In relation to ASAT warfare, it seems that the US could 
have more to lose than the USSR if the build up of capabilities con­
tinues, since it is more reliant on space systems for surveillance, 
warning, communication, meteorological and navigation (14°). It is 
difficult to imagine how the US would be able to operate 
effectively in the modern battlefield without these systems.
The question of whether the US should proceed with the 
development of ASAT weapons is therefore one of the most important 
and pressing defense issues currently facing the US and indirectly
141also the Western alliance ( ). The Reagan Administration believed
that the US must have an ASAT capability to deter attacks against 
it' s own space systems since the USSR has got a working ASAT 
system. However, the USSR has on several occasions indicated that
14 2they are willing to limit the development of these systems ( )
and several of the US allies have also expressed concerns over the 
current trends (143).
1 : UCS pp. 200-201. op. cit. ^
140: Senate Committee on Appropriations 18 April 1980 p. 1362.
141: It is of course the US which has the initial decision on
the issue of proceeding with the plans. However, as in relationio 
the US SDI project, several allies have voiced concern on the<£ 
matters.
142: "Soviet legal view on military space activities" by Mal­
colm Russell in "National interests and the military use of spaa?* 
edited by W. J. Durch (Harvard 1984) pp. 169-200.
143: There would be several problems in reaching an agreement 
even if the political will to so existed. These inclur*? 
verification and the exact definition of what constitutes <2 
satellite system. The role of ground stations is vital and thöj;£
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Figure 8 is derived from a hearing in the US House of 
Representatives Committee on Armed Services where the USAF pre­
sented their space programs for authorization request. The figure
14 4shows the coverage of their space tracking network ( ) at that
time (i.e. before the modernization) .
Figure 8 : US Spacetracking Capabilities.
_j~//
Source : US House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services,
21 March 1985 p. 1000.
must therefore be protected just as the satellites themselves. Fur­
ther, the link between the satellites and the ground station 
should also be protected against interference. It is clear tn<2^ 
these conditions would pose serious problems for the negotiators-
144: March 1985 p. 1000. Redrawn because of the poor qualiiy 
of the chart.
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The main problem with the present system is that the 
different radars can only detect/track objects which pass through 
"on top" of the radars and within the range of the beam. In other 
words, the radar is limited by the range and the horizon. This 
means that unless a satellite passes through one of the circles 
shown on the map in their orbiting around the earth, they will not 
be detected, tracked and catalogued. This is one of the reasons for 
the great interest from the US side in developing space based 
sensors of some kind (another reason is that it would reduce US 
dependence upon foreign bases).
The role of Thule can only be illustrated if one also 
knows where the US and Soviet satellites are in orbit (the 
inclination) and compares this with the tracking capabilities of 
the Thule installation.
If Thule is to perform an important function one of two 
criteria must be met : either that many satellites can be monitored 
from the base, or that the few satellites which can be monitored, 
are very important in various connections.
Since geostationary satellites are out of sight for the 
installation at Thule, only highly elliptical and low orbiting 
satellites can be detected.
The most important variable in relation to the Thule radar 
and detecting/tracking capabilities of low or highly elliptical 
orbiting satellites is the inclination (angle between the orbital 
plane of the satellite and the equatorial plane of the Earth) of 
the satellite. If the perigee is somewhat less than 5000 kilometers 
(dependent upon the distance from Thule) an "educated guess" would
79
be that: satellites with an inclination ranging from 75 to 100
14 5degrees could be detected from Thule ( ). An orbit with an in­
clination of 90 degrees would be used to pass the polar regions.
Because the Soviets have important facilities in the Arctic 
regions (for instance the Kola Peninsula and nuclear submarines) 
they use highly elliptical orbiting (Molniya orbits) satellites 
for their communication etc. These have an apogee of 40 000 km and 
perigee of 500 km. The position close to the North pole is the dis­
tance which is the furtherest away from the Earth, and Thule is 
therefore unable to track them. However, the USSR has some 
satellite systems which orbit within the purview of Thule. Among 
these are navigation satellite systems ( Ex. NAV 2 and 3), some 
meteorology systems (Ex. Meteor 1 and 2), electronics intelligence 
system ( Ex. ELINT 2) and also several photographic intelligence
14 6systems ( Ex. Low Resolution and HI Resolution 2) ( ). For the
purpose of ASAT warfare the number of USSR satellites which orbit 
within the purview of Thule is, however, relatively little.
The US SDS (Satellite Data System) satellites, which 
handle communication with the forces in the Arctic are positioned
147in Molniya orbits ( ). Neither of these satellites would be de­
tected by the radar at Thule. Again the reason is that they will be' 
at a distance too far away from Thule when they pass the 
installation.
The US has for instance two navigation satellite systems
145 : Thule Air Base is positioned on 77.40 degrees North
69.00 West.
1 4 6 : UCS p.190-93 op. cit.; see also SIPRI yearbooks 1986 pp.7<f- 
84 and 1985 pp. 149-56.
147 : UCS p. 187. op. cit.
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(Transit and NOVA), two meteorology systems (NOAA and DMSP), three 
photographic intelligence systems (KH-9, KH-11 etc) which have an 
inclination and perigee within these limits.
Finally, the main limitation for the location at Thule 
in this regard, is that the radar will only be able to track the 
passing satellites for just a few minutes and that most satellite 
systems are thus out of "sight" from the radar.
On the basis of this information, it is difficult to term 
the radar as "an essential part" of the US spacetracking system. 
This is especially true when the question of ASAT warfare is being 
dealt with.
Even though the capabilities of the radar at Thule are 
limited in relation to ASAT warfare, it is an area which the Danish 
Government and political parties would have to adress. This would 
pose difficult problems for political decision makers, since it is 
difficult to discern between the stabilizing and destabilizing 
functions of the radar's spacetracking capabilities.
C) THE RADAR AT THULE AND ARMS CONTROL:
The last and most intensely debated issue discussed in the 
1987 debate was the implications of the modernization in relation 
to arms control especially the ABM Treaty. It was claimed by the 
opponents of the modernization that the upgrading to LPAR standard 
could lead to a process which could be detrimental to the ABM Trea­
ty. Some of the claims and concerns relating to this issue were:
81
148"Thule radar is not violating the ABM Treaty" ( ) and "In sum,
both the US and USSR are constructing LPAR's that violate the ABM 
Treaty" ( ). For the purpose of this discussion, two subjects
will be dealt with; firstly, the role of the modernization of the 
radar at Thule in relation to the ABM treaty, and secondly, the 
role of Thule in monitoring for instance USSR missile tests and 
thereby also verification of arms control agreements.
C.l: Thule and the ABM Treaty:
Grey areas in arms control agreements often presents
150substantial problems ( ). Among these were the radar controversy
between the US and the USSR, the dispute about tactical ballistic 
missiles and finally the problem presented by the possibilities of 
ASAT weapons. The main problem is that arms control agreements and 
treaties are often hard to prove, since situations occur which are 
not foreseen.
LPAR’s importance in an ABM system was acknowledged in the 
negotiations of the ABM treaty, and it was therefore agreed that 
restrictions upon them were necessary. Because of the complexity 
and size, it takes years to build them, and it is therefore percei­
ved that they are the long lead time for an ABM system. v
One important distinction is whether a violation is
148: Article in Information 27 January 1987 by US Information 
Agency.
14 9 : ACT March 1987: Peter Zimmerman: "The Thule, Fylingdales, 
and Krasnoyarsk radars" p, 9.
150: John Pike in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, April 19&S 
pp. 12-15.
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contradictory to the letter or the spirit/goal of the treaty (151) . 
This is crucial since a dispute over actual compliance with 
treaties is often used for political purposes and in political 
battles. One such example is the case of whether Thule and
152Krasnoyarsk are violating the ABM treaty ( ). These violations
could have been dealt with in the Standing Consultative Commission 
(SCC), but were used exactly for political purposes.
In the case of Krasnoyarsk, there is almost consensus 
that it is a clearcut violation of the treaty since it is not lo­
cated anywhere near the periphery of the USSR territory. The 
disagreement is really whether it has got serious military implica­
tions. The critics (the US administration) argue that the radar is 
a part of a later Soviet ABM system, while the less concerned cri­
tics (more or less the arms control community) argue that the radar 
is simply an early warning radar intended to fill in a gap in the 
USSR warning system towards the north east. Everybody apart from 
the Soviets agree that the main function is not spacetracking as 
the Soviets claim. This is due to the direction of the radar and
151: One can perhaps argue that this distinction more reflects
how a legal ( "the letter of the treaty" ) and a political ( "the '.spi­
rit" ) argument would sound. In other words, that the political de­
cision makers would look more to the spirit of the treaty i n j W  
absence of such a decisive institution as a "Supreme Court" rar 
the solution of the issues in the case of Thule and Krasnoyarsk,^ 
would perhaps be easier to reach an agreement if the purpose was to 
uphold the spirit of the Treaty more than the letter.
152: It seems that the work on the Krasnoyarsk radar has vir­
tually stopped. The Soviets have now offered to close down the to- 
stallation before it reaches operational status, see ACT Novem^?r 
1988, p. 29. The question of whether a modernization of the instal­
lation at Thule would be a violation of the ABM Treaty surfa^3 
for the first time in 1985. See Information 11 February and 30 Oc­
tober 1985.
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1 c: oit's frequency ( ).
In the case of Thule, the US administration argues that 
the new LPAR is just a "modernization” of the old installation and 
therefore permitted by the ABM treaty. The administration's 
opponents on this issue argues that this is not the case, but that 
the LPAR in fact is a new installation. The important parts of the 
treaty in this respect are Articles VI (b), VII and Agreed 
Statement F.
Article VI (b):To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the 
limitations on the ABM systems and their components 
provided by this treaty, each party undertakes:(b): Not deploy in the future radars for early
warning of strategic ballistic missile attack, 
except at locations along the periphery of the 
national territory and oriented outwards.
Article VII:Subject to the provisions of this treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or 
their components may be carried out.
Agreed Statement F.The parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars 
having a potential (the product of mean emitted 
power in watts and antenna area in square meters) 
exceeding three million, except as provided for in 
Articles III, IV, and VI of the Treaty, or except for 
the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or 
for use as national technical means of verification.
It is the interpretation of these parts that the 
argumentation centres around. Several points will be made in 
relation to these conditions.
1 c o : See A. Mack, "Threats to the ABM treaty", Working Pape<~
No 21, (Australian National University, Canberra 1987), pp.1-7.
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Firstly, there is the disagreement about the potential of 
the radar and the provisions in the treaty - Agreed Statement F. P. 
Zimmerman, who has done extensive research on the radar issue and 
arms control, argues that the potential of the radar at Thule will
154be above the limits set in the treaty ( ). The potential of a 
radar is calculated as the product of the average power emitted 
multiplied by the area of it’s face ( ). Zimmerman argues that
the potential of Thule will be "well over the threshold" (156). The 
potential is set in the Treaty at the maximum to be three million 
units, while the potential of the LPAR at Thule will be up to forty
157million units ( ). The Soviets have also noted this and filed in
an official memorandum to the Danish Department of Foreign Affairs 
concerning this point (158).
Secondly, there is the disagreement about the term "on the 
periphery of the nation" as it is reflected in Article VI (b). The 
critics of the modernization argue that since Thule is not a part 
of US territory, there cannot be any case for the new radar. It is 
not quite clear if a LPAR outside a contracting nations periphery 
is permitted by the Treaty. LPARS on the periphery are clearly 
legal, while LPAR’s inside the territory are forbidden, except for'
154 : ACT March 1987 p.9; see also common agreed statement F.
155 : Agreed statement F.
156: ACT March 1987 p. 9.
157: Information 15 March 1988.
158 : 4 January 1987, Memorandum released as press information 
from the USSR Embassy in Copenhagen.
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159the uses as described in Agreed Statement F ( ). Raymond Garthoff
who negotiated Article VI (B) argues that the treaty does not allow 
room for a "permissive" interpretation. He argues that: "no radar
installation for early warning in the future could be deployed 
outside the national territory" (16°). The Reagan administration's 
answer to these points is that since the radar is just modernized, 
it is perfectly legal with the LPAR in this location i. e. that the 
Treaty "grandfathered" the existing sites. Therefore, the argument 
is really whether the radar is just modernized or is in fact a new 
radar. On this basis the question is what constitutes the 
difference between a "deployment" and a "modernization". The Treaty 
does not discuss this aspect. It is, however, clear that no parts 
of the old installation are used in the new LPAR, and this has led 
the critics to use the following analogy:
"It is like building a nuclear power plant in 
place of a wood stove and calling it a 
modernization" (161).
The critics point out that the new LPAR radar is totally 
different in design and construction from the old radars and thereby 
has immense new potential. Stephen I. Schwartz of University of' 
California points out that the Secretary of Defence, Caspar Wein­
berger in a report to Congress for the fiscal year 1986 referred to
159 : 1) Spacetracking; 2) Within small ABM missile and deploy­
ment area permitted by the Treaty; 3) For national technical me£>n<> 
of verification; 4) At Abm test ranges.
16°: Information 5 March 1987.
161: See "Radar trap and opportunity", New York Times 29 Ja­
nuary.
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the US "Replacing obsolete radars", while it in the 1987 report was 
termed "modified radars" (162). The reason for this change of ter­
minology could be found in the erupted debate about the legality of 
the modernization, which started just after the 1986 report.
Raymond Garthoff, who was a principal US negotiator of the 
ABM treaty, and who in fact was negotiating the article VI (163) 
argues that the modernization to the LPAR standard is not allowed 
within the frame of the treaty. He argued in a letter to the New 
York Times on February 14 that Article VI,b and Agreed Statement F 
grandfathered or excepted only the existing radars and not the
164sites at Thule and Fylingdales ( ).
In a statement made to the Folketing, the Foreign Minister 
Uffe Elleman Jensen, argued that the new LPAR at Thule was legal 
according to the ABM treaty. His argument was based upon an 
interpretation of the ABM treaty whereby it is perceived, that if 
an installation is not explicitly forbidden, it is then legal. He 
argued further, that the radar would not be contrary to the 
treaty’s objective (or spirit) since it was not and could not be 
used in a SDI project (165).
P. Zimmerman argued in a reply to the Foreign Minister 
statement, that the ABM treaty did not allow room for this 
interpretation (166). He argued that the treaty was "constructed"
162: From A. Mack "Threats to the ABM treaty", op. cit.
163: Information 5 March 1987, p.l.
164: Arms Control Chronicle, Vol 19, July 1987, p.ll.
165: Folketingets Forhandlinger 29 January 1987, pp. 6645-6656.
166 : Information 3 March 1987 p. 3.
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in such a way that everything which was not explicitly legal, was 
forbidden (167) . The Foreign Minister in a direct reply to Mr. 
Zimmerman during the debate on 5 March 1987 in the Folketing still 
maintained his interpretation (168).
Peter Zimmerman (169) also argues that the value attached 
to the word "deploy" is crucial for the interpretation of the 
treaty. The wording of the treaty is just that "future deployments 
of early warning radars must be on the national periphery". 
Zimmerman argues that the official US definition of the word 
"deploy" as given in the February 1986 "Report on Soviet 
noncompliance" gives clear evidence that the modernization at Thule 
is not allowed :
"Deploy as used in Article VI of the ABM treaty 
means to site or locate at a particular position 
[this is the wording in the report] This 
definition of deploy apparently allows the old 
radar to remain. But by the same standard, the 
new LPAR's represents "deployments" initiated 
after the ratification of the treaty" (17°).
The Soviets have also argued along these lines in the 
same note to the Danish Department of Foreign Affairs as mentioned 
above (171) .
167: See also A. B. Carter, "Ballistic missile defense", op.
cit. p. 222.
168: Folketingets Forhandlinger p. 8317.
169: ACT March 1987 p.10.
170: ACT March 1987, p. 10.
171 : Information 7-8 February 1987, p. 1. The Foreign
Minister, Uffe Elleman Jensen, argued during the debate on 5 ManH 
1987 that the Soviets did not protest, but only sent a "memo­
randum"; Folketingets Forhandlinger p. 8336. This version 1$
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Another point in the discussion about whether the radar is 
violating the ABM treaty, is two reports made before the whole con­
troversy started. The first is the report by an expert group during 
the negotiations in 1971, in which it is assumed that upgrading of 
the radars at Thule and Fylingdale to LPAR's would not be permitted 
by the wording of the treaty ( ). The then member of the National
Security Council, Henry Kissinger, was chairman in a panel which 
"supervised" the negotiations. The expert group was reporting stra­
ight to this panel. Both groups did their work in Washington and 
were therefore not formally members of the ABM delegation.
The second report is the report mentioned above (chapter 
Three), from the US Air Force in 1980, refused the modernization 
on the grounds of : Costs, longer implementation time and POTENTIAL
173VIOLATION OF THE ABM TREATY ( ) . This is fairly good evidence
that even within the armed forces there was substantial doubt as to 
whether a modernization would be within the spirit or letter of the 
ABM treaty.
One substantial question must be answered before a 
settlement can be reached on the radar issue; that is whether thd 
possible violation is really a violation of the spirit or the 
letter of the treaty. In other words, whether the new radar does 
add anything significant to the US ABM capabilities. It has been
probably the correct interpretation.
172: Information 5 March 1987 p. 1.
173 : Lt Kelly Burke during testimony to Senate Committee for
Appropriations 18 April 1980 pp. 1675-77.
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argued above that the primary purpose of the modernization of radar 
was to give enhanced early warning and assessment data, and that 
the US SDI/ALPS project was a marginal "additional" bonus. However, 
the effectiveness of the installation in discriminating botwoon 
decoys and warheads would diminish the military utility somewhat 
should the Soviets make use of countermeasures. Therefore, it can be 
argued that the military effectiveness of the Thule radar would not 
be significant in any SDI system, and thereby not constitute a 
violation of the Treaty's spirit.
On the US side, the push for the modernization can be 
argued to be a part of a greater political game. It is clear that 
parts of the Pentagon would like to see the constraints of the ABM 
treaty disappear (174), and the modernization in Thule (and later 
Fylingdale) could be used to help erode the foundation of the 
treaty. The constraints of the ABM treaty are especially felt to be 
in relation to the SDI project, and the ensuing discussion of the 
"broad or narrow" interpretation derives from this. Therefore, it 
seems important for the defenders of the narrow interpretation that 
the US and the USSR comes to some sort of an "modus vivendi" on the
175radar issue ( ). During the "review conference" within the SCC on
174 : This would remove certain present constraints on the S 
project.
175 : Several options lie ahead. The most likely is that the
radars of both nations will be allowed to be upgraded to LPAR stan­
dard, since the military significance of this would be limited. 
Nevertheless, other options could be considered. Among those men­
tioned is that none of the radars will be allowed; instead it couW 
be agreed that both nations could install "state of the art conven­
tional radars". This is probably unrealistic since large resources 
have been invested in the constructions by both sides. More, 
important is that it would be politically unwise for both parties 
to admit that they had been violating the very important treaty.
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17631 August 1988, the superpowers did not reach this agreement ( ).
C.2 : Thule and arms control verification:
A last point to be briefly touched upon - that is the 
role of radar at Thule in monitoring USSR missile tests and 
therefore for the question of whether the radar serves any important 
role in verification of arms control treaties.
There are generally four categories or sources from which 
the US obtains information concerning Soviet missile tests. These 
are : radars, satellites, air and ship-borne sources and finally
electronic intelligence.
While the old installation in the early days of its life 
made a significant contribution to the overall picture (177), new 
technologies soon took over. It was especially satellites, which 
proved more efficient in the early 70’s. The old radar was only 
useful for data about the midcourse trajectory, and even in this 
area it was quite limited.
"Because these radars [BMEWS] provide 
rudimentary trajectory data, the launch point 
and the time of launch, they are valuable for 
basic verification of missile flights. But 
while they may be able to monitor the fact that 
flight tests have taken place, they are only 
able to differentiate crudely between the 
different types of missiles launched; they 
cannot discern qualitative improvements to 
existing systems" ( ) .
176: ACT October 1988 pp. 2, 25; and ACT December 1988, p.27.
177 : F. Hussein, Adelphipaper No 165 (London 1981) p. 40-42j 
P. Claesson "Middelhavets Perle", appendix (Eirene, Copenhagen 19$$ 
and Owen Wilkes in The Peace Research Center’s newsletter December 
1987 p. 4 (Australian National University).
17B: F. Hussein, p.40. op. cit.
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A necessary question is if the upgrading would in any way 
enhance the tracking capabilities in this respect, or if the other 
sources at present are fully capable of performing the task. A 
recent article by J. Richelson ( ) in which he describes the US
system for verification, the BMEWS are not mentioned at all. This 
is a clear illustration of the very limited role of the radar at 
Thule (18°).
To sum up the chapter:
The aim of the chapter was to discuss the modernization of 
the radar in relation to the claims in the Danish debate concerning 
SDI/ALPS, ASAT warfare and implications for arms control. The major 
conclusions are as follows:
* It seems unlikely that the radar would constitute an important 
feature of the US SDI/ALPS system due to the lack of ability to 
discriminate between decoys and warheads. This contribution would 
be significantly offset by the installation's vulnerability to 
various Soviet countermeasures. It should be noted that in the case 
of a decision to activate an early deployment of ALPS, the
179: Jeffrey Richelson in ACT October 1986 pp. 14-19. HoweVer
J. Richelson does not explicitly mention the sources for monitori'ij 
ICBM launches from Plesetsk, and SLBM launches from the White 
north of the USSR. These tests would be within the reach of 
beam from Thule.
18 0 : It should not be forgotten in this connection t'n&b
another system at Thule - the Satellite Control Facility (SCF) 
is probably important in both collection of data from satellites* 
(ex. Jumpseat electronic intelligence satellite, KH-9 and KH~H 
which plays a very important role in monitoring USSR activities1 
relaying data to the US, and controlling the various satellite s^ 
terns. It would therefore play a valuable role in regard to a^> 
control agreements and their verification.
9 2
possibility exists of including Thule as one of the sensors in the 
structure. This was clearly evidenced by information released by 
Lockheed in relation to the ERIS system.
** Thule would only be of marginal importance in relation to ASAT 
warfare. Further, the tracking of satellites and objects in space 
also has a stabilizing purpose/effect.
** The modernization of the installation raises serious questions 
in relation to the ABM treaty. It is difficult to argue that the 
new LPAR in itself does not constitute a deployment, and thereby 
violates the letter of the ABM Treaty. It is, however, not as easy 
to decide whether the modernization is in fact a violation of the 
Treaty’s spirit since the capabilities in relation to SDI/ALPS 
systems are quite limited. This interpretation is further amplified 
by the claims that the USSR in fact has accepted the modernization 
in SCC (x ). The superpowers have contrary to this claim not yet 
openly reached a "modus vivendi" on the radar issue.
181 : Information 7-8 February 1987.
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In the Danish debate, there is almost no 
tradition for a detailed discussion of and 
political decisionmaking on issues of nuclear 
strategy. Outside the immensely limited group 
of experts (that is a few bureaucrats, officers 
and researchers) only a limited knowledge exist 
of strategic problems in general and nuclear 
strategy especially" (182).
CHAPTER FIVE :
THE RADAR, THE POLITICAL DEBATE IN DENMARK AND THE SD POLICY ON 
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE.
In this chapter the role of the US military installations 
at Thule will be discussed in relation to the SD security policy and 
especially in relation to the position on nuclear deterrence.
The chapter starts with a general description of the radar issue in 
the Danish debate. Secondly, the SD policy on nuclear deterrence, 
SDI, arms control and the radar issue is analyzed.
A) THE ,POLITICAL DEBATE IN DENMARK ABOUT THE MODERNIZATION 
OF THE RADAR AT THULE. v
First, a few comments should be made about the 
parliamentary conditions in Denmark during the last few years. The 
term "working multiparty system" is a fairly good description of 
the party system in Denmark. During the last two decades, there 
have been more than nine or ten political parties represented in 
the Danish Folketing at the same time. The implication of this, is
182: lb Faurby, Hans Henrik Holm and Nikolaj Petersen: "Kampfrn 
om sikkerheden" (Politica, Arhus 1986) p. 42.
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that it is difficult to create a government with a solid and stable 
majority behind it. In the area of security politics the picture 
has been extremely confusing for outside observers since the SD 
lost power in September 1982. The ruling Government (a four party 
minority coalition) until 1988 faced an "alternative parliamentary 
majority" on many defence issues. This "alternative majority" was
183composed by the SD ( ), The People’s Socialist Party (SF), The
Left Socialists(VS) and a small defense critical party (RV). The 
latter party supported the Government on economic issues, while 
supporting the other parties in opposition on security and defense 
issues.
This alternative parliamentary majority had forced the 
Government to accept several resolutions critical of the US and 
NATO nuclear strategy in recent years. Among the most 
controversial were the Danish resistance in NATO against the 
"double track decision" and support of the infrastructure program 
economically; resistance to support of SDI programs; against first 
use of nuclear weapons; and the motions for talks at ministerial 
level about a creation of a "Nordic Nuclear Free Zone". These reso­
lutions have often been received with skepticism by the US and 
other NATO allies. When the alternative majority became manifest in' 
1983 and then began to demand more active cooperation by the 
Government, which resulted in several footnotes in NATO 
communiques, the term "Finlandization" was in some circles changed
183: The SD used to be in government for several decades wi^ i 
minor breaks, and has a stable representation of roughly 30 % »n 
elections, and thereby represent a major force or influence in Dan»^ 
politics.
95
to "Denmarkization" (184). In May 1988 an election was called 
again and resulted in the termination of the so-called alternative 
majority since the little defense critical party (RV) joined two of 
the previous partners in the former government and formed a new 
government (185).
The debate in Denmark about the modernization of the 
radar in Thule was a result of a series of articles in a Danish 
paper, Information, in the beginning of 1987. It was apparently new 
to. the public in both Denmark and Greenland that there could be 
doubts about the legality of a LPAR in Thule. The debate in Denmark 
had not been very extensive concerning the US installations and 
their functions until this time (18u) . The present Danish Government 
was quick to issue a statement on 13 January 1987, saying that the 
US had given assurances in 1983 that the upgrading to a LPAR 
standard of the radar was consistent with the ABM treaty.
The alternative parliamentary majority was not satisfied 
with this statement, especially since the newspaper Information was
184: E. Bj01, "Denmark, between Scandinavia and Europe"
International Affairs, Vol 7, No. 3, autumn 1986.
185: The three parties in the new government are RV, The Con 
servatives and Venstre (a party with a special following in ruöl 
areas. v
186: In 1983, a parliamentary debate followed the publishing
of the book "Middelhavets perle" by Paul Claeson (Eirene 1983) 
However, the debate was centred around the central claim of 
book, namely that not only the radar, but also several other U9 
facilities in Greenland, were geared into a US first strike strate­
gy* A typical example from the debate in the Folketing is 
statement by Pelle Voigt (SF):
"[The BMEWS installation] has only got one function, namfcty 
in the situation, where you from the Western side orchestrate cZ 
surprise attack on the USSR, and where the BMEWS installation in J 
later phase can be used for what they are good at: very precisely 
to track the few Soviet missiles remaining which have survived the 
first strike, with the purpose of eliminating them". Folketinggis 
Forhandlinger 10 February 1983, p.5885.
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publishing one interview after another with former US arms control 
negotiators, who regarded the modernization as a possible 
violation of the ABM treaty.
Demands were made by the alternative majority about 
further information and clarification of the issue. It was clear 
that many of the spokesmen of the opposition parties feared that the 
installation at Thule could be used in a future SDI or ASAT system. 
The term "warfighting" was not mentioned at all during the debate.
On 30 January 1987, the Government issued a statement (via 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Uffe Elleman Jensen) in which, it 
was argued that the controversy concerning the legality of the in­
stallation could only be solved by the contracting parties to the 
ABM treaty, namely the USA and USSR.
The alternative majority was not satisfied with this 
statement and announced a debate in the Danish Folketing on 5 March 
1987. The discussion in the Folketing had a surprising outcome 
since the alternative majority fell apart for the first time since 
its inception. A resolution was accepted which consisted of 5 
points:
1) That the early warning installations at Thule cannot be used v 
offensively.
2) That it cannot be used in connection with SDI or an ABM system.
3) That the Danish and Greenlandic authorities receive continuous 
information on developments relating to the Thule radar 
installation.
4) That the United States and the Soviet Union are requested to 
reach an agreement on interpretation problems relating to the 
ABM treaty concerning warning installations like the one at 
Thule.
5) That in NATO and in direct negotiations with the United States 
and the Soviet Union (the government urges) that the strict
187interpretation of the ABM treaty is upheld ( ).
It was further decided that a committee (the Committee for 
Defense) should look into the case and report to the Folketing in 
due course. It seems however that the work in this committee (in 
regard to this specific case) has virtually stopped ( ). It could
be questioned if this act was more than simply a case of "symbolic 
politics" i.e. that the decision to deal with the radar issues in 
this Committee was merely to quiet down opposition until the main 
discussion was over. Later when other issues were higher on the 
political agenda, nobody would then raise critical questions.
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B) THE SD POLICY ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, SDI AND ARMS CONTROL:
The purpose of this part is to analyze the SD position on 
nuclear deterrence and relate this to the function of the radar 
installation at Thule. One important limitation for the analysis 
has to be stated explicitly here. It is difficult to use a kind of 
"rational actor model", "unitary actor model" or "analytic para- 
digm"( ) as a point of departure for this kind of discussion.
187 : Nikolaj Petersen "Denmark, Greenland and Arctic security 
in Kari Motola (Ed): "The Arctic challenge" (Westview Press 1^ 93 8)
p.17. The voting pattern was: 103 in favor of the resolution (s’>^
CD, V, RV, KF, KRF), 2 votes against (FRP) and the Left Socialists 
(VS) and the Peoples socialist Party (SF) abstained»
188: Information, 27 july 1987.
189: See for instance Graham Allison "Essence of decision'*
(Harvard 1981); John Steinbruner: "The cybernetic theory of deci­
sion. New dimensions of political analysis" (1974 Chapter twcjj 
Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach: "The elusive quest: theory <2^
international politics" ( 1988 chapter six); Arild Underdahl: "C4/\J
we, in the study of international politics, do without the mooet 
of a state as a Rational Unitary Actor" in Internasjonal Politfkk 
1/1982 pp. 63-79.
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This is of course related to for instance the sheer size of the SD 
party i. e. that there are different factions within the party with 
different goals on various issues ( ). This is no less different
on this matter of policy and the SD ( ). In an analysis of the 
party's policy it would therefore be ideal if the availability of 
data permitted this kind of assessment - it would no doubt be an 
qualitative improvement. The analysis for the purpose of this paper 
is mainly at the unitary party level during this chapter, while 
the next chapter does go into more detail with the various concep­
tions within the SD party. The reason for this is primarily because 
the SD party has not been very explicit on the "nuclear deterrence 
issue", and secondly due to the lack of available data ( ).
Several points could be made here in relation to the 
general function of the radar station and other aspects of the
193US/Danish bilateral relationship( ), but the emphasis is on
190 : Other limitations could in the availability and processing 
of information; the "value integration"; and cognitive aspects 
also have played a role.
191: see Per Voetman: "Dobbelt beslutsom" (Arhus 1986); En^
Boel: "Socialdemokratiets atomväbenpolitik 1945-88" (Akademisk Fork*) 
1988).
\
192 : During the summer of 1988, I had interviews with several 
Social Democrats, but it was very difficult to get a coherent p.t 
ture of the party’s policy. Further, it was difficult to disoern 
the factions in the party (since these are not formal in any wa y) , 
but generally it can be said there are three factions: A) the ri^t 
wing (custodians as the jargon has labelled them) which is most 
line with the official NATO policy; B) The group which is increasing­
ly skeptical towards the concept of nuclear deterrence and its func­
tion as preventing outbreak of war. C) The leftist group - mainly 
young parliamentarians - who do not believe in the nuclear deterrent,-?: 
concept.
193 : Some of the aspects which could be discussed in more
detail here if space permitted could include:
1) Danish reliance upon the US for defense of Greenland;
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nuclear deterrence, SDI and arms control in this paper due to the
194centrality of these concepts in the discussion so far ( ). In the
previous chapters it has been shown that these issues were most 
central in the Danish debate and in relation to the initial 
modernization decision.
In relation to nuclear deterrence two aspects have to be 
discussed: that the radar has a warning function; and that it has a 
warning, assessment/characterization function i. e. for the purpose 
of a nuclear warfighting strategy.
The SD and most other political parties in Denmark agree 
that the warning function per se is an important prerequisite for
2) Danish reliance upon the US for equipment and intelligent 
data;
3) whether the installation violates Danish sovereignty;
4) the relation between the modernization and the ASAT capability 
of the radar.
194 : In a similar discussion about US installations in Au­
stralia, Desmond Ball argues that at least five points have special- 
interest in the public debate:
1) The role of the installations in relation to enhancing deterrent 
and thereby global strategic stability.
2) The importance of the installations in relation to arms control 
agreements.
3) The probability of the installations being nuclear targets 
the further implication of this.
4) whether the operation of the installations are violating (ao 
not) the host country's sovereignty.
5) Whether the installations are compromising the development o-f <1 
more independent defense and foreign policy for the host country
D. Ball, "A base for debate" p. 65. op. cit.
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195deterrence ( ) . The SD has argued along these lines not only at
the parliamentary debate in 1987 but also in 1983 where it was 
stated:
"A part of this balance [the strategic balance] 
is unfortunately to continue to have the ability 
for what we call "second strike"... It is 
therefore useful with an effective warning 
system, and in this is included the 
Danish/American agreements concerning the 
American facilities in Greenland"( ).
In Chapter Three it was demonstrated that one of the 
reasons for the modernization was to make the installation more 
reliable. Therefore it seems natural to look positively at the 
radar in this light.
However, as mentioned before, no parties have argued that 
the main purpose of the modernization (to increase warfighting 
capabilities) could be destabilizing, by making nuclear war more 
likely ( ) .
In relation to the concept of "nuclear warfighting" the SD 
position is not quite clear. The need for "extended deterrence", 
which implies that the US is willing to face the USSR with nuclear 
weapons in the event of an aggression from the Eastern block is 
quite strong in many political parties in Denmark. In the SD partyv 
this perception seems to be eroded presently. Nevertheless, the
1 9 5 : Folketingets forhandlinger, 29 January 1987, p. 6645;^
March 1987 pp. 8289, 8310. See also Lasse Budtz in Information \°\
March 1987.
196: Knud Damgaard in Folketingets Forhandlinger lo February
1983, p. 5873.
197 try
: For a similar argument in relation to US bases in Austra­
lia, see A. Mack: "US bases - an ongoing debate" . Forthcoming
Workingpaper from the Peace Research center, Australian National University
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party has not revealed any coherent or comprehensive position on 
the issue of nuclear deterrence. No party program discusses the 
concept in any detailed way, Therefore, it is necessary to look at 
more general comments and statements from leading Social Democrats 
as well as the more general statements in the party program to 
analyze the SD position on this subject.
There is little doubt that SD?s fundamental goal is to get 
away from a situation of nuclear deterrence as the way of preserv­
ing global strategic stability. The former spokesman for the party, 
Lasse Budtz, expressed it in this way:
"The Social Democrats do not believe in the-
balance of terror ..." (198) .
On the other hand the party is saying that the 
terrorbalance is the way to preserve peace, at least in the near 
future. Knud Damgaard, former SD Minister for Defense said:
"It was then, and it is today the foundations
of [nuclear] deterrence which is preventing
M  / 1 9 9 \war" ( ) .
This gives the impression that the SD regards the 
terrorbalance (nuclear deterrence) as something necessary in the 
near future, while the party would like to get away from this 
situation in a longer time perspective.
It is more complicated to analyze which position the SD
198: Folketingets Forhandlinger 3 May 1984, p. 5277.
199: Folketingets Forhandlinger, 10 february 1982, p. 5873.
1 0 2
has on the specific kind of nuclear deterrence it perceive as 
necessary in a shorter timespan. A number of statements, however, 
provide a picture of the party's position. The party has been 
working in the Folketing to pressure the Government to "work for an 
international agreement which forbids the first use of nuclear 
weapons" (2°°). L. Budtz put it this way:
"We (SD) saw also that the Danish Government 
works for an international ban on the first use 
of nuclear weapons" ( ).
Further, in a letter to the Danish newspaper, Information, 
he claimed :
"The Danes have several times declared, that exactly they (the Danes) do not wish to be 
counted amongst those who would like to be 
defended by nuclear weapons" ( ) .
These two statements indicate a negative attitude towards 
the official NATO strategy of "flexible response": the SD view more 
resembles a belief in "assured destruction" as discussed in Chapter 
Two. On the question of nuclear warfighting, the party has not di­
rectly come forward with an explicit position. The latest party 
program (1983) on security issues does however discuss these issues 
in a fairly general way. In the program it is argued:
"that any talk about limited nuclear war is both 
meaningless - and dangerous" ,
200 : Resolution accepted in the Folketing on 3 May 1984.
7 01 : Folketingets Forhandlinger, 3 May 1984 p. 5278.
202 : Information 27 July 1988.
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and
"A limited nuclear war would .......  become a
global nuclear war” ( 203 ).
These two last statements again indicate that the SD does 
not believe in nuclear warfighting strategies and further regards 
them as potentially undermining the global strategic stability. 
Further, the present SD spokesman on defense matters (Hans Hask- 
kerup), said during a recent debate in the Folketing that:
"For us Social Democrats, the goal is to get 
all short range nuclear weapons removed from 
European soil. We want to have the third "zero". 
For us the combination of short range nuclear 
weapons and the NATO doctrines concerning 
forward defense and first use of nuclear wea­
pons is a "suicide-cocktail". (2 *°4).
This clearly shows the critical view in the SD towards the 
NATO strategy of flexible response or warfighting. The change 
within the SD party has also been noted by Nikolaj Petersen from 
Department of Political Science at University of Arhus, Denmark who 
argues in a recent article:
"This basic low-key, but acquiescent attitude to 
nuclear weapons is no longer characteristic of 
the Danish Social Democrats. Without explicitly 
rejecting flexible response, their doubts and 
concerns with respect to the role of nuclear 
weapons in NATO’s strategy have multiplied to a 
point where they are, in effect, no longer 
adherents of NATO's strategy on this important
2 0 3 : SD party program on "Om sikkerhedspolitik oq tot<2(.
forsvar". (1983).
: Folketingets Forhandlinger 13 March 1989, p. 7854.?04
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issue" ( 205 ) . (emphasis added)
The SD perception of nuclear deterrence probably has a 
foundation in a significantly different threat assessment (of the 
USSR and Eastern bloc) than for instance the official NATO and US 
perception.
N. Petersen and I. Faurby in a conference paper used the distinc­
tion between "deterrence" and "reassurance" ( 206 ) as the two guide­
lines for a country's security policy:
"Stated in very general terms it could be 
said that the main theme of the country’s 
[Denmark’s] security policy debate is what two 
elements - deterrence and reassurance- 
specifically should consist of and how they 
should be balanced against each other" ( ).
This distinction is also useful in an analysis of the SD 
party's position. In this chapter it is useful to emphasize that the 
new trend within the SD party has moved the position where the
205 : Nikolaj Petersen: "Security policies of small NATO cou
tries" in Cooperation and Conflict, XXIII,, 1988, p. 149.
206 : For a very good presentation of these two concepts, see
Michael Howard: "Reassurance and deterrence: Western defense In
the 1980's" in Foreign Affairs V. 61.2 (1982) pp. 309-24. This dis­
tinction can also be translated to a different context, namely Die, 
objectives of the Harmel Report i. e. the goals of the 
alliance. The report stress both political goals (reassurance) 
military (deterrence) goals. In the discussion of the Hah? 
strategy, a cleavage can be found in the relative value Or 
importance countries attach to these two elements.
Glenn H. Snyder: "The security dilemma in alliance politics"in
World Politics, V. 7,4 (Spring 1985), pp.3-41 discusses -e*>o
parallel concepts (but within alliances): "Entrapment"
"Abandonment". The discussion in this paper could go even furtfeer 
and apply this pair of concepts, but the limits of space do not 
allow this. See also Robert Jervis: "Cooperation under the security
dilemma", in World Politics 30 (January 1978), pp. 167-214.
207 : I. Faurby and N. Petersen: "The far north in Danish secu- 
rity policy". (Institute of political science, University of Arhu5; 
1988), p .13.
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reassurance aspect is now somewhat stronger than the deterrence
208aspect ( ). The US nuclear strategy of warfighting emphasizes the
opposite. Here the deterrence element is significantly stronger 
than the reassurance element.
On the question of SDI, the SD has expressed its position 
more clearly than on nuclear deterrence. This has been achieved 
through parliamentary debates and in statements in newspapers etc. 
It. is clear that the SD is very concerned with regard to the US 
administration’s plans in relation to the SDI/ALPS project. Lasse 
Budtz summed up the SD position during a parliamentary debate in 
1986:
’’The position of the SD is clear: we will 
continue to work for... a no to first use [of 
nuclear weapons]. We are against the SDI program 
and other star wars programs, we will work 
against a violation of the ABM treaty...." (2°9)
After the Debate in the Folketing in March 1987 the SD 
spokesman on security policy issues, Lasse Budtz, and the spokesmen 
from other parties (R and SF) sent a note to the US Congress (210) 
to underline the content of the resolution accepted in the 
Folketing in March 1987. The aim was to make sure that it was knownv
208 : Petersen and Faurby, op. cit. comes to this conclusion!
"To put it simply, the SD traditionally have emphasized the re*V 
surance aspect of security policy somewhat stronger than the 
£large bourgeois parties [Venstre and the Conservatives]", p. 27.
209 : Lasse Budtz, quoted in "Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Arbog
Edited by Nikolaj Petersen and Christian Thune (Copenhagen 1981^ 
p .240.
210: The letter was sent to Les Aspin, the Democrat who is
chairman of the Armed Services Committee in the House of Represents 
tives and to the Democrat Sam Nunn who is leader of the Armed ser­
vices Committee In the Senate. Information 10-20 March 10R7.
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in Washington that the resolution stipulates that the Thule radar 
is not to be used in relation to a future SDI system(211).
In relation to arms control and here especially the ABM 
TREATY, there has been widespread disagreement in the Folketing 
about the implications of the modernizations as shown in the 
previous chapter. The Danish Government reassured the Folketing 
that the modernization was in agreement with the ABM treaty (212). 
However, the resolution (written by the SD) which was accepted in 
the end, stipulated that the Danish Parliament preferred a 
restrictive interpretation of the ABM treaty, and in this way put 
certain pressure on the US. It was at the same time accepted that 
the superpower's had the final decision, and in this way direct 
pressure on the US was not applied. This could have been done by 
accepting a resolution stating that the radar (after the 
modernization) could not be used until an agreement between the US 
and the USSR was reached. The Social Democrats held a fairly low 
profile during the debate which was dominated by the two left wing 
parties (The Left Socialists and The Peoples Socialist Party) and 
the Foreign Minister. During a conversation with Mr Lasse Budtz on 
1 August 1988, he assured me that he did believe that the 
modernization did constitute a violation of the ABM treaty. Several' 
people who were present at the SD parliamentary group meeting 
(where the decision was taken on how to act in the radar issue) the
211: It should again be said that the type of SDI as presently 
considered would probably not be destabilizing in itself. One c2n 
on the other side, argue that the process early deployment wou6d 
start, could be highly destabilizing. It could very likely makst 
void the ABM treaty, and possibly start a totally new arms race.
212 : Folketingets Forhandlinger 29 January 1987, pp. 6645-4?/ 
and also 5 March 1987 pp. 8289,8310-11.
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morning before the debate in the Folketing, have told me that Lasse 
Budtz and several other more critical Social Democrats were told 
"how to vote or not show up in the Folketing". In fact, the speech 
which Lasse Budtz did make in the Folketing the day after was not 
written by himself, but by Mr Svend Auken! ! ! The next chapter 
discusses this cleavage within the SD in more detail than here, 
where it is sufficient to state that there was some disagreement 
within the party as to what position to take during the 
parliamentary debate.
To Sum Up The Chapter:
The chapter has analyzed the SD position on nuclear 
deterrence and concluded that it resembles an "assured destruction" 
conception as discussed in chapter two. On this basis there is 
clearly a cleavage between the general SD position on nuclear 
deterrence and the position on the radar issue.
Further, it was shown that the SD party is against the SDI 
project and clearly expressed concerns in relation to the potential 
use of Thule in a US SDI architecture.
Finally, it was argued that the SD position on the radar' 
issue was not quite in accordance with the party’s policy on arms 
control - in particular, the ABM treaty. This was due to the 
modernizations implication in relation to the ABM treaty. In the 
former chapter it was argued that the modernization was a quite 
clear violation of the treaty's letter, while it is more doubtful 
whether it is also a violation of the treaty's spirit. It was 
argued that there were different positions within the party as to
108
this subject.
In this thesis it is interesting to look at the Danish SD 
reactions in relation to the background for the modernization, and 
ask which factors can explain the formulation (or lack of formula­
tion) of the policy. On a number of related issues the SD has been 
very recalcitrant, but on the radar issue, the party seemed to be 
rather accommodating. The next chapter seek to analyze this 
apparent contradiction.
x
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"The historian.... continuously
the question ’why?,and as long 
hopes for an answer, he cannot 
(2l¥) •
asks 
as he 
rest"
CHAPTER SIX:
ANALYSIS OF THE SD POLICY ON THE RADAR ISSUE.
If the SD is critical* towards the strategy of nuclear 
warfighting , SDI and against any violation of the ABM Treaty, a 
logical conclusion must be that the modernization of Thule is 
contradictory to their policy aims. However, there are other 
interests that the SD will have to accommodate when considering 
their policy stand on the "radar issue". Among these are other 
aspects of Danish security, the bilateral relationship between 
Denmark and Greenland, the reactions from alliance partners and 
implications for future political constellations in the Folketing. 
Therefore it is crucial to take these points into consideration 
when analyzing the SD position on the US installations in 
Greenland.
To answer the question of the Danish SD policy stance on 
the US facility in Thule, it is therefore necessary to conduct the
214inquiry at different levels of explanation ( ).
213: E. H. Carr: "What is history" (Penguin Books 1964), p. 8?.
214 : These levels are taken from an article by M. Krasner and 
Nikolaj Petersen, Journal of Peace Research, June 1986 pp. 155-93» 
The term "level of explanation" as used in this part, should not 
indicate any causal relationship. The term "level of actors" cou<j
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Figure 9 illustrates the framework for the following discus­
sion:
Figure 9: Influence paths with respect to the formulation of poli­
cies for Danish political parties" ( ).
also be used here. The main purpose behind the framework is to h<** 
a guidance for the analysis.
: Petersen and Krasner, op. cit. p. 164.
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It will be argued that four main paths of influence were 
the main factors behind the SD position on the Thule case and the 
security policy on this issue.
Firstly, there is the transnational or international 
level, which is illustrated by arrows no. 1.
Secondly, there is the relationship (interparty level) 
between the SD and other political parties in the Folketing. Arrows 
no. 2 shows this influence path.
Thirdly, there is the intra party level. Arrow no. 3 show 
this relationship.
The framework does not deal with the relationship between 
Greenland and Denmark. This was certainly an important aspect in 
the decisionmaking process and will therefore have to be dealt with 
below as the fourth influence path.
The following discussion does leave out the rest of the 
influence paths illustrated by the model. These are regarded as of 
marginal importance, and the scope of this thesis does not leave 
space for a discussion of these factors (216). The relative weight 
of the four main influence paths will be discussed in the finalv
215: Some examples of these other influence paths could be:
* The peace movement in both Denmark and other countries. Itaob> 
quite clear that the Danish peace movement was not very active at 
all when the discussion surfaced in 1983 and 1987. I have only been 
able to find one letter to a newspaper (Information) which should 
that the peace movement was aware of this issue !!
* Public opinion: here the same was the case; very few people out­
side the so called security establishment showed any interest tn 
the case.
* Even though there are Danish economic interest connected to 
modernization of the radar (contracts for construction etc), ho 
information show that the SD was influenced by this fact.
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part of the paper.
A) The external or international level:
The bilateral relationship between Denmark and the US is
unique in many ways. The defense of Greenland is almost exclusively
left to the US, even though it is a part of the Danish Realm ( ).
This is clearly so since Denmark has not got the defense resources
necessary for the appropriate defense. It is, therefore obviously
clear that the defense of Greenland is a serious problem facing
every Danish administration, and that the present structure of the
international system and the geography of Greenland does not leave
much leverage for finding other potential external allies. Another
218argument could be that the US perceives ( ) Greenland as a part
of its sphere of influence, and thereby attains this influence via
upholding the defense of the island. Another way of securing the
influence over the large island is by giving special trade conces-
sions to the Greenlandic people ( ), or by providing special ser-
220vices to the Greenlanders ( ).
217 : N. Petersen, "Denmark, Greenland and Arctic security
p.2 op. cit.
218 V: The Monroe doctrine, see the Greenlandic peace movement 
perception of this aspect in "I demokratiets navn" by Jens Thof*/ 
Henrik Zahle, Baltser Andersen and Klaus Birkholm (Egtved 1987 Den­
mark). pp.23-24.
219 : This is actually the case in certain situations. In late 
1986, the Greenlandic people acquired customsfree access to the Ut 
market without any special conditions. Further, it has been ques 
tioned whether there was any external (read US) influence in -the 
negotiations after Greenland decided to leave the EEC. The Green 
landers achieved quite favorable conditions.
220 : The US military provides a long range of services for
the Greenlanders. Among these are: The airport at Sdr Stromfjord,
emergency assistance both on the inland ice and at sea, and 
monetary inflow into Greenland as a result of the US bases.
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Secondly, there is the direct Danish dependence upon the 
US is in relation to security issues for the defense of Denmark 
proper. In security matters there is of course the reliance upon 
the US strategic arsenal as a final deterrent against a potential 
USSR attack or blackmailing ( ). The Danish membership of the
NATO alliance in 1949 came about against a background of fears 
regarding expansionist USSR moves. The defense of Denmark proper is 
clearly the major and preeminent problem facing decisionmakers due 
to.the geostrategic location and importance of Denmark as "the cork 
in the Baltic".
Thirdly, there are also other areas where the SD could 
perceive Denmark as dependent upon the US, for instance the 
reliance upon the US especially for intelligence, equipment and 
training of the Danish defence forces.
Fourthly, there is the area of trade, where a more 
recalcitrant SD and Danish position towards the US installation at 
Thule could have a "spill over effect" on the trade between the two 
countries. Fear of economic sanctions and technical trade barriers 
comes to mind here.
A fifth, and more sophisticated argument to explain the 
position of the SD Party's behavior in this area is, that if the USV 
alliance partners start to question US installations function in 
the US strategy openly, then this could indicate serious disagree­
ment within the alliance and thereby weaken the credibility of the 
whole NATO structure. This could in a longer term perspective
221 : For a good description of the difficult geostrategic posi­
tion of Denmark, see "Soviet strategist target Denmark" in Interna­
tional Defense Review, Vol 19 No. 8 1986, by C. N. Donelly and 
A. Petersen; DE September 1986 pp 132-35.
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mean a threat to the global strategic stability, if the Soviets 
tried to take advantage of this position of "declining Western 
resolve" ( 222 ).
A sixth point is that the Danish SD work closely together 
with the Norwegian Labor Party and other Western SD parties in the 
Scandilux group on these issues. It can therefore be argued, that 
the Danish SD would be reluctant to change their policy until a 
common stand was reached with the members of the Scandilux group 
and especially the other SD party in Norway ( '). On other aspects
of the SD security policy there has been a tendency to "clear" 
critical issues within the Scandilux group before a final position 
has been reached. The SD position on the double track decision is a 
good example of this decision making process ( 224 ) .
The last factor of importance is the fact that the base 
is already there, and the SD decisionmakers perhaps feel that it 
rather limits the demands they can make on the US. The fact that 
the US actually defend the island means that Denmark is very 
vulnerable if this ceases to be the case. Denmarks meagre defense 
resources makes this virtually impossible. It is not easy to assess 
the SD position on this aspect, due to the fact that none of the\ 
information available for the thesis point explicitly in this
222 : See A. Mack for a similar argument concerning the US bases 
in Australia: "US bases - an ongoing controversy" op. cit.
223 : See Nikolaj Petersen: "Scandilux og Danmark" in "Man hpr
et Standpunkt... " edited by S0ren M0ller Christensen (Eirene 19&9 
pp. 64-81.; and Per Voetman, op cit, pp. 62-66, 84.
224 : Nikolaj Petersen argues that the Scandilux work has impor­
tance in relation to : information gathering; political analysis
and the presentation of policy options, op. cit p.73.
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direction. If conversations between SD policymakers and for 
instance US embassy staff and other of the US administrations offi­
cials were revealed, perhaps the explanatory power of this argument 
could be decided ( 225 ).
To sum up the analysis, the SD reluctance to openly 
critizise the US installation at Thule can therefore be explained 
by 7 conditions at the international level:
The Danish reliance and dependency upon the US in relation to
* the defense of Greenland,
* "the nuclear umbrella" and conventional support for the 
defense of Denmark proper (2zo).
* the need for US military equipment, training and 
intelligence( 227 ).
225 : Svend Auken (the present leader of the SD and the leading 
person in the creation of the party's position on the radar isSu* 
in 1987) has had several contacts with staff at the US Danish embAS 
sy, and has been invited to the US by the US administration on S6 
veral occasions. The content of the conversations could of cou16 
be interesting in this connection.
226 : It is further likely that a Danish position which severeW 
questioned the US engagement in Greenland also could have seri^ i* 
implications in relation to the other NATO allies. On other occa^ i. 
ons, the British have argued that since the Danish contribution^ 
NATO's defense efforts is relatively small, it would perhaps recon 
sider its engagement in relation to the agreements on how to heU 
defend Denmark with support from British conventional forces.
227 : In relation to the Danish reliance upon the US in relation 
to intelligence, it could be argued that the US and the NATO paH 
ners are also reliant upon Denmark for collection of intelligent, 
about especially the Warsaw Pact countries close to the Baltic S&2 
In case Denmark was cut off from intelligence cooperation with th 
US, it could also be possible to obtain the relevant data from ot^e 
sources. Intelligence sharing is probably often taken place especial 
ly on a bilateral basis, and the best sources for intelligence w.-h 
special interest for Denmark would be Sweden, Norway and West Ger 
many. It would certainly still be possible to obtain the necessar 
data from Sweden and one can probably assume that the cooperate 
in the intelligence field would continue between Denmark and No av*
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* trade.
* the lack of coordination with other SD parties in Western 
Europe.
* the fact that the base is already there and that the US uphold 
the defense of the island.
* the "declining resolve" argument.
B).The second level of analysis is the internal level.
Here, the parliamentary political (interparty) level in 
Denmark is important. When the discussion about the capabilities of 
the modernized radar took place in early 1987, the Government had 
several times indicated that there were limits for what it could 
accept in defence and security policy matters in terms of resolu­
tions etc from the alternative majority. The underlying threat was
that in case something "really unacceptable" came up the Prime
228Minister, Poul Schlüter, would call an early election ( ). There
was therefore a great deal of speculation concerning tactical moves 
around this aspect, since the SD had learned that it would not be 
very favorable for them to have an election campaign, where the
/ West Germany since data from Denmark would be of equally hrc^  
importance for these nations. It is difficult to see how the U' 
should be of special importance in this relation. Dependence upon 1 
specific intelligence cooperation can also be a disadvantage. O. 
Ball argues that an intelligence relationship which is not geac^ : 
into the specific purposes of both (or all) parties can lead 
distortions of defense postures and foreign policies for the smalier 
countries ( "The ties that bind" Sydney 1985 p. 304.). In the sar 
way, a reliance upon an ally, can be detrimental in relation tc 
both equipment and training.
228 : He did in fact call an election on a security policy issue, 
in May 1988!
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229main theme was security politics ( ). A resolution with serious
criticism of the modernization, or even a prohibition of using the 
modernized (new) radar before agreement was reached between the US 
and the USSR, could have this effect. So could a demand for an 
independent commission to investigate the matter; this idea was 
brought forward during the debate. In addition to this problem, it 
could be difficult for the SD to withstand criticism from the right 
wing parties, concerning the Danish credibility within NATO. This 
cogld have serious implications in later elections, since the majo­
rity of the SD voters are firm NATO supporters ( 230 ) . It can also 
be argued that if the SD wanted to keep doors open for later coop­
eration with parties in the Folketing, a strong criticism of the US 
could make these opportunities less likely. It was therefore easier 
to accept the middle road and avoid serious conflicts in the 
Folketing ("31).
229 : The discussions about the double track decision had not 
led to any success for the SD a few years earlier, and Social DeflVj 
cratic parties in Europe had experienced the same.
230 : Krasner and Petersen, p. 170. op. cit
231: Auken had earlier sought to establish a broad majority 
or consensus on the Danish security policy by the proposal to-6S~ 
tablish a commission (under the Department of Foreign Affairs)-to 
lay the analytical groundwork for a more common position betwö2< 
the SD, RV and the Government.
The little defense critical party (RV), which was crucial -6>r 
the support of the Governments economic policies, was in a simile 
situation. It had todecide which issue was of the greatest impor 
tance: to continue to support the minority coalition on econon« 
policies and at the same time vote for a milder resolution, OF 
break off the cooperation with the coalition Government and vvtJ 
for a more strongly worded resolution as suggested by the two leF 
tist socialist parties. Both RV and the SD chose the middle groun 
and -joined the Government in the resolution accepted on 5 Mao* 
1987.
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C) Thirdly, there is the intra political level.
In this regard it is especially relevant to look at the 
personal battles within the SD Party concerning who should become 
the successor after the expected resignation of the Chairman, Anker 
Jorgensen, and also the fear of creating deep cleavages within the 
party. The radar issue could prove to be the test case for 
determinating how far the SD would go in its formulation of the 
security policy. In other words, which faction could win support 
for its views.
Before the controversy around the radar issue erupted, 
there had been a vigorous debate about the future of the party's 
security and defence policies. The rightist parts of the party had 
resisted many of the official policy recommendations, and in certain 
instances members of the Folketing had crossed the floor and thereby 
broken the party discipline. In the attempts to secure support from 
as many parts of the party as possible, Svend Auken (who was tipped 
to become the new leader of the SD party - and also became leader) 
had to accept hard compromises with the right wing faction of the 
party ( ). If these considerations were already taking place in
the beginning of 1987, this could have affected the SD Partys 
standpoint in the debate in March 1987. Auken was at this time 
political spokesman for the parliamentary group ( 233 ), and thereby 
able to heavily influence the final decision to go down the middle 
road. During the meeting in the parliamentary group (where the SD
232 : It should here be noted that the majority of SD voters
is overwhelmingly NATO positive - in polls the SD voters typically 
score around 2:1 margin in favor of NATO membership. Krasner 
Petersen, p.170. op. cit.
233 : This is probably the most important task, apart from bei^ 
leader of the party itself.
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position was clarified before the debate in the Folketing the same 
day) Auken was the leading person ( 234 ). The left wing faction of 
the party had been the most active in the newspaper debate leading 
up to the 5 March parliamentary debate ( ) . It seems that there
were different opinions between Mr. Budtz and Mr. Auken on security 
issues. There has since been renewed controversy between the two 
people, which (perhaps) resulted in the voluntary exit of mr. Budtz 
from the Folketing in 1988. Several political observers saw this 
step as a direct protest against Mr. Auken.
D) Finally, but also at the internal level, is the relationship 
between Greenland and Denmark. This part of the discussion is 
mainly centred around the fragility of the ties between these two 
people.
When the Homerule was established in 1979, there was a 
great deal of discussion about one particular aspect: the rights to 
the revenues of the minerals in the Greenlandic subsoil. From the 
Greenlandic side it was first argued that the rights should belong 
to the Greenlanders only, while the present Danish Prime Minister 
(Anker Jorgensen) clearly said that if this was the case, there was
234 *: Some participants to the meeting have later indicated
that he tried to "bully through" his own point of view. This 
tried by stating that there was nothing controversial in the moder­
nization etc. When the leftist members of the SD parliamentary 
group (Lasse Budtz and Jytte Hilden) argued that this was not-the 
case, they were told that "either they followed the party line or 
did not show up in the Folketing" . Certainly Auken had 
advantage of being quite well informed on the issue as was Lasse Budt*..
235 : Information 5 March 1987: here Jytte Hilden stated th3t
the Thule issue was more important than the previous resolutions rn 
the Folketing accepted by the alternative majority. Concerns were 
also expressed by DSU (the SD youth organization) and Alt 
(Arbejderbevaegelsens Internationale Center) on the modernization 
decision.
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no need to talk about a Greenlandic Homerule under the Danish 
realm. In other words, if this was what the Greenlanders wanted, 
they would have to create their own independent nation, and in this
236way become fully independent of Denmark ( ) . The parties agreed
on a loosely worked out scheme, the main part or principle being 
that both people have the rights to the revenues in case this 
becomes relevant.
From this it becomes clear that one of the Danish reasons 
fop continued involvement in Greenland is probably partly related to 
the hope of getting some economic gain in the future when it 
becomes viable to extract the various minerals. In addition to 
this, as mentioned briefly in the introduction, there is the 
question of whether the US bases in Greenland are the single most 
important Danish contribution to the Western alliance. If this is 
the case, it seems like the low defense budget is partly a 
consequence of this condition. Other things being equal, if the US 
installations were not in Greenland and (or) Greenland not a part 
of the Danish Kingdom, the Danish defense expenditures would have 
to be significantly higher to match other countries in the 
alliance. To host US military installations can in this perspective 
be regarded as quid pro quo for not building up conventional forces' 
in Denmark. Finally, the SD was in government while the US bases 
were established in Greenland. It would therefore be awkward for 
the SD to suddenly argue that the US installations functions were 
detrimental to both Greenlandic and Danish interests. This would 
certainly undermine the credibility of the SD party in the eyes of
23 6 : There is within the Greenlandic society,especially on
the far left wing, sometime expressed a wish to become fully in­
dependent of Denmark.
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the Greenlandic people ( 237 ).
On the basis of this it seems that the SD has an interest 
in not politizising the issue of US military installations in Green­
land, because the consequences could be detrimental to perceived 
general Danish and SD interests.
To sum up the chapter:
The discussion in the Folketing in relation to the US 
radar at Thule did not focus on the capabilities of the radar in 
relation to the US strategy of "nuclear warfighting". This could be 
seen as quite surprising especially when considering that the 
alternative parliamentary majority had critizised many other aspect 
of the NATO strategy : "deep strike", first use, and deployment of 
Pershing and Cruise missiles. The background for the SD position 
could be found in various factors. At the international level, 
Denmark is clearly dependent upon the US for the defense of 
Greenland. In relation to the perception of the dependency of 
Denmark upon the US for the defense of Denmark proper, there seems 
to be changes under way. However, there seems still to be a firm 
belief that the US nuclear umbrella and conventional support are
237 : The little Greenlandic party IA has on several occasions 
argued that the Greenlandic people have too little insight in -i>v£ 
US activity in Greenland, and that the Danish authorities do rot 
provide sufficient information on the issue. Demands have been made 
for the creation of a "base-commission" which should look into 
the matter of US installations in Greenland. The ruling Siurout 
party has taken a more pragmatic stand on this issue. The lea3t<~ 
J. Motzfeldt stated: The USA security is also our security" Berv
lingske Tidende 10 March 1985 and has after the radar controversy 
agreed in a statement with the Foreign Minister, Uffe Eller'M 
Jensen that the radar only has a defensive purpose and has a grc>dt 
importance for the defense of the Western alliance , Dansk Udeo- 
rigspolitisk Ärbog 1987 edited by Nikolaj Petersen and Christie 
Thune (Copenhagen 1988), p. 183.
1 2 2
needed for the defense of Denmark. It has also been argued that the 
reason for the SD stand should be found in a perceived dependence 
upon the US for intelligence, equipment and training of Danish for­
ces. Another important factor at the international level is the 
cooperation between the Western SD parties in the Scandilux group. 
Usually the Danish SD clarifies its position in the group before a 
final position is reached on controversial issues. The radar issue 
was not discussed within this group, and this perhaps was an 
important factor in the SD "non-decision making" on the issue. The 
fact that the base is there and the limitations for the SD was 
also put forward as a contributing factor. Finally the "declining 
resolve argument" was presented, i.e. that the SD did not critizise 
the US installation openly due to the implications it could have on 
the relationship between the two major blocs.
At the internal level, three factors could have influenced 
the SD position. Firstly the potentially fragile political 
relationship between Denmark and Greenland. A politization of the 
role of the US bases could disrupt the relationship between
238Copenhagen and Godthaab ( ). Secondly, tactical considerations in
the Danish Folketing could have influenced the voting and the 
discussions in the debate. Finally there is the intra party level.' 
The need for the new chairman Svend Auken to keep all fractions of 
the party behind him for the later battle for a leadership position 
can also have had significant influence in the policy formation 
process.
238 : The capital of Greenland
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"The search for causalities in history is 
impossible without reference to values . . . 
Behind the search for causalities there lies, 
directly or indirectly, the search for values" 
(Meinecke 239 ) .
CHAPTER SEVEN:
CONCLUSION:
The US BMEWS radar at Thule, Greenland has been 
operational for nearly three decades now. The installation has not 
been the subject of much political debate or research in Denmark 
during this period. The reasons for this are complex, but one of 
the important factors is the radar's geographical location, which 
is very far away from the political/economical centre of Denmark, 
and therefore not seen as significant in the Danish debate 
concerning security issues. Secondly, the fairly technical nature 
of the subject has been hampering any real discussion about the 
capabilities and the functions of the installation. The discussions; 
concerning the radar have therefore had a tendency to go astray and 
been riddled with speculations and sometimes contradictory 
assertations. Thirdly, there has probably been a certain hesitation 
among many political parties to go into any detailed debate about 
the nature of the US engagement in Greenland due to the fear of
239 : "Kausalitäten und Werte in der Geschichte" translatedtn
F. Stern: "Varieties of history" (1957), pp. 268,273.
124
politizising the US installation and in this way maybe indirectly 
critizising the US activities. Finally, the implication for 
Danish/Greenlandic cooperation, which has had certain fragile 
tendencies, might also become politizised had a debate concerning 
the relevance of the base surfaced. On this basis, it seems that 
most political parties had a clear interest in not going into any 
detailed discussions concerning the nature of the US base in 
Greenland.
The purpose of this paper was twofold. Firstly, to 
describe the installation, its functions, the modernization, place 
in the US warning system and role in relation to ' the present 
developments in the US strategic policy (research questions one to 
four). The second purpose was to analyze the Danish SD position on 
this specific subject (research questions five and six).
In the Second chapter, it was demonstrated that tactical 
warning is essential in the nuclear age. Without effective and 
reliable warning systems it is difficult to argue that the concept 
of "nuclear deterrence" is credible. The chapter presented 
different conceptions of nuclear deterrence (assured destruction, 
warfighting and warwinning) and showed that one of the' 
preconditions for more elaborate nuclear options is related to the 
demands on the C3I systems.
The Third chapter, discussed the role of the Thule radar 
in the warning system, and concluded that the main role of Thule is 
tactical warning and assessment of Soviet ICBM’s, and SLBM’s 
launched from the Arctic region. In the case of launching of 
ICBM's, Thule would perform the role of confirming attack and
125
providing data on attack characterization and assessment. The 
modernization during 1986-87, had as its basic rationale a desire 
to enhance capabilities for further attack characterization and 
assessment, with the further purpose of enhancing the credibility 
of the US warfighting nuclear strategy. This was clearly expressed 
during testimony to the US Congress. Without the data that the 
installation at Thule and other ballistic missile warning sensors 
are supposed to help provide, it would be difficult to argue along 
these lines, i. e. that a nuclear warfighting strategy is possible 
or credible. On the basis of these findings, it was concluded that 
the initial decision to modernize the installation was to enhance 
nuclear warfighting capabilities.
The radar also has certain space tracking capabilities 
and is therefore of marginal use if the US should proceed with the 
development of an ASAT system. However, the radar's spacetracking 
capability is also of some use in relation to identification of 
space debris which reenter the atmosphere, and thereby also has 
clearly stabilizing purposes.
Chapter Four showed that Thule would not be able to 
perform any significant function in a SDI system intended to protect 
population. However, the debate is no longer centred around the' 
system for population protection since this is generally considered 
to be both technically and economically impossible. In relation to 
the more feasible research in the areas of either a more limited 
SDI project or an ALPS (for protection of hard targets, strategic 
forces etc), it was argued that Thule is currently considered as 
one of the sensors for a near future deployment (ALPS). The chapter 
did however emphasize the present shortcomings of such a system.
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The most serious criticism with respect to these systems potential 
is that it can easily be jammed or spoofed, and the lack of 
discrimination between decoys and real warheads. For the Soviets 
these countermeasures would both be cheap and simple.
The discussions in the Danish Folketing concentrated a 
great deal of its effort around the question of Thule, the ABM 
treaty and arms control. In chapter Four, it was argued that the 
modernization of Thule is a violation of the treaty's letter for 
several reasons. In this relation it was emphasized that "grey 
areas" often provide difficult and substantial problems in relation 
to the interpretation of arms control treaties. The modernization 
of Thule is no different in this respect. However, there are also 
several points, which indicate that the modernization went beyond 
the wording of the treaty. Firstly, the modernization means that the 
radar has a tremendous new potential. Secondly, in fact, the 
modernization is not just a modernization - or upgrade of the 
existing radar - but a "deployment" of a new system. This is 
essential as to the treaty's wording explicitly forbids the 
contracting nations to deploy LPAR's except along the periphery of 
their national borders. The crucial question in the process of 
reaching an understanding on the radar issue and the ABM Treaty is' 
related to whether the modernization is just a violation of the 
treaty's letter or if the upgrading to LPAR standard in fact 
constitute a violation of the treaty's spirit. The conclusion in 
chapter Four held that the upgrading is a rather clear abuse of the 
treaty's letter, while it is far from certain that this is the case 
in relation to the spirit/purpose. It is doubtful if the new LPAR 
does add any significant capabilities to a US ABM system. The
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Soviet countermeasures would still be cheap and simple.
The last point in relation to the arms control issue was 
whether the radar plays any positive role in monitoring arms control 
agreements etc. It was argued that initially, the radar performed 
some functions in the US network for monitoring USSR missile tests. 
However, it seems that this role has decreased significantly pri­
marily due to the fact that more sophisticated systems have
appeared in the last decade. It can on this basis be concluded that
the. question of whether the upgrading is in accordance with the ABM 
treaty is the main question. In other words, if one interprets the 
upgrading as detrimental to the arms control process, there are no 
positive spin-offs in relation to other areas of arms control.
The second objective of this paper was to analyze the 
Danish SD policy on nuclear deterrence, SDI and arms control (ABM 
treaty) in relation to the US installation at Thule. This was done 
by comparing with other security policy aspects of the SD party 
platform. The most striking feature of the analysis was that the SD 
does not have any explicit, coherent or consistent policy on the 
concept of nuclear deterrence. The party has not at any time
released any comprehensive information concerning its stand on the ' 
question of nuclear deterrence. As many observers have put it: 
"They just simply have not thought this through, but are working on 
some sort of incremental basis in questions which deals with this
240aspect - there is just simply no basic framework" ( ). The party's
24 0 : After my return to Denmark in June 1988, I had severtfC
conversations with people who are generally regarded as belonging 
to the "elite/establishment" in the issue area of security polic^ 
as well as present and former SD spokesmen in this area. Erik BoCi 
notes in his book on the SD nuclear weapons policy that: "The pattern
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stand on nuclear deterrence was therefore analyzed on the basic and 
very general comments as made in the party's last program and by
241former spokesmen ( ) for the party. Due to the lack of specific
information from the party the conclusions tend to be of a somewhat 
tentative nature.
Nevertheless, it was clear that the party was directly 
opposed to the use of the radar in relation to any ABM or SDI 
project. The SD resolution, which was accepted in the Folketing in 
March 1987, clearly said this. The plans for either a first phase 
SDI or a ALPS with the present available technology, i. e. the 
ERIS/HEDI system as suggested by Lockheed and McDonnel Douglas, 
would clearly be in direct opposition to the party's policy. 
Presently, the party seems to take a fairly pragmatic stand on this 
issue, and apparently wants to wait for new initiatives or 
decisions from the new Bush administration before making (further) 
moves in this area. If any concrete steps are to be taken by the 
new US administration, which could lead to the use of Thule in 
relation to one of these systems, it would be interesting to see 
which initiatives the Social Democrats might take.
In relation to the radar's integration in the US nuclear 
strategy of warfighting, the SD has not voiced any concern. A very' 
substantial assumption here (for the later analysis) was that the 
SD policymakers were fully aware of this connection between the
for the party's decision making has some times been: two steps for­
wards and then one back. [The SD] has navigated from case to cast) 
any long term strategy is it difficult to see, but the fundamental 
tendency is visible" op. cit. p. 16.
241 : The SD has now a new (Hans Haekkerup) and fairly inexpert- 
enced spokesman on security issues. Lasse Budtz left the Folket'uV) 
in 1988.
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radar modernization and warfighting capabilities ( 242 ) .
In chapter Five, it was shown that the party is opposed to 
any talk of limited nuclear war, which it regarded as both meaning­
less and dangerous. At the same time it was expressed that a 
general belief in the party was that a limited nuclear war would 
become a global nuclear war. In other words a rather critical 
stand on the issue of nuclear warfighting was adapted without 
explicitly saying that this US strategy could be destabilizing.
Add to this the resolutions in the Folketing concerning the 
abandonment of first use as an allied strategy and the talks about 
creating a Nordic Nuclear Free Zone. Moreover, previous chapters 
have shown that the initial modernization of the radar had the 
rationale of providing information on the character of a USSR 
ballistic missile attack to assessing the impact of various 
strikes, thus permitting more informed and selected responses. This 
attack characterization and assessment capability is critical to
243the success of any warfighting strategy ( ) .
On this basis, there seems to be a lack of coherency or 
perhaps even a contradiction in the SD policy and this will have to 
be explained by a number of other factors.
At the parliamentary level, one of the main reasons for' 
the party's hesitations on the issue of US installation in Greenland 
can probably be linked to the tactical considerations for future 
political cooperations with other parties in the Folketing. The SD
242 : During my conversations with the SD politicians, none of
these indicated that they were unaware of this relationship between 
the modernization and the US nuclear strategy. Whether this is <ju-e 
to the "bluff" of the interviewee's or not is impossible to decide.
24 3 : D. Ball, "A base for debate", p. 88, op. cit.
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was aware of the risks involved in a further politization of the 
issue. In recent years, a politization of security issues in Danish 
politics has also had a tendency to lead to a polarization. Such a 
polarization could very easily be detrimental to the party's other 
political objectives. In other words, the priority of the radar 
case was not high enough on the SD political agenda to risk a 
major confrontation. Such a confrontation could also lead to a
general election, which the SD certainly did not want on this
issue.
At the international level, a further critical stand on 
the radar case would also provide the party with ‘ substantial 
problems in the relationship with NATO and the US. If the Folket- 
ing did oppose the modernization on the grounds that it would
enhance nuclear warfighting capabilities, it would be far more
serious than the resolutions passed in the Folketing during the 
last six years. The potential reactions from the alliance partners 
would no doubt have influenced the SD stand on the issue. To 
complicate the matter further Denmark is almost entirely dependent 
upon the US for the defense of Greenland due to its meagre defense 
resources. At the same time, it is perhaps not wrong to point to 
the perception within Denmark about the lack of influence upon thev 
US nuclear strategy. Especially within the SD there is an 
understanding of the need to work in cooperation with other 
countries if any long term goals are to be attained (the work 
within the Scandilux group).
The Danish/Greenlandic relationship also affected the way 
in which the SD handled the radar issue. Any further politization of 
the US installations could easily affect the bilateral relationship
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in a negative direction. In recent years the question of greater 
autonomy has surfaced in Greenlandic politics. At the same time the 
question of Greenlandic control or further insight into the US 
bases has been raised. A further politizitation of the issue could 
amplify these tendencies.
A last factor behind the SD hesitations on the radar 
issue is to be found at the intra party level. Since 1982 there 
have been several serious discussions within the party in relation 
to.security policies. This has especially been the case during the 
numerous resolutions accepted in the Folketing. On several 
occasions SD members of the Folketing have broken the party 
discipline and crossed the floor. The leaders of the party 
therefore had to act very cautiously in these matters in order not 
to make present cleavages deeper. Especially Svend Auken had a 
clear interest in a united party in the internal battle over the 
party's leadership.
To sum up the discussion, it is necessary with some 
concluding comments between the relationship concerning domestic 
politics and highly technical strategic issues. It seems that the 
former has primacy, and that the discussion in Denmark on strategic 
issues quite often "goes off the track" due to the lack of 
knowledge on behalf of the political decisionmakers. Only very few 
politicians within Denmark have a detailed knowledge of strategic 
issues and on this basis loose speculations are often difficult to 
get rid of. In this political environment, it is easy for political 
decisionmakers to look at short term advantages in relation to 
domestic politics instead of going to the heart of the strategic
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debate.
Hopefully, this paper can provide a point of departure 
for a more informed political and public debate on just one issue 
in the Danish security policy debate.
To end this thesis, I would like to quote Keld Olesen 
(former SD Minister for Foreign Affairs):
"Nobody with insight and sanity today 
believe in limited nuclear war - or even that
4there will be a winner" ( ).
244 : Kjeld Olesen: "Introduction" in "Man har et Standpunkt. . 
Edited by S0ren M0ller Christensen (Eirene 1984), p.ll. He is partly' 
citing Egon Bahr !!.
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